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PENDENT JURISDICTION
MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION
AND THE 1976 CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT
Arthur D Wolf*
I.

INTRODUCTION

At least smce the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure m 1938, the trend m tnal practice has been to encourage the
JOImng of clrums and partIeS m a smgle actIon so that related ques
tions of law and fact may be adjudicated at the same tIme.! "Un
der the [Federal] Rules, the Impulse IS toward entertrunmg the
broadest possible scope of actIon consIstent with frurness to the
partIes; Jomder of clrums, partIes and remedies IS strongly encour
aged."2 Such liberal Jomder rules promote the values of conve
mence and frurness to the partIes as well as that of JudicIal
economy Persons who have legal disputes among themselves no
longer need to engage m multIple actIons to resolve related
controverSIes.
ThIS altogether salutary trend m modem cIvil practIce, whIch
has elimmated a number of difficultIes under older rules of prac
tIce, has m tum created a number of newer problems. One of
those problems relates to the questIon of attorney fees, the subject
of thIS artIcle. Suppose, for exrunple, the plamtiff asserts two dis
tmct but related clrums agrunst a defendant. Assume further that
the legIslature has authonzed the award of attorney fees to the pre
vailing party with respect to only one of those two clrums. Now
suppose the plrun tiff wms the lawsuit but recovery IS based on the
clrum whICh does not have an attorney fee provIsIon. Is the plruntiff
nonetheless entitled to counsel fees because they may be awarded
ASSOCiate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law,
A.B., Tufts Umversity 1962; LL.B., ColumbIa Law School, 1965. From 1973-78, Pro
fessor Wolf served as specIal counsel to Representative Robert F Drman of the
Fourth CongressIOnal Distnct of Massachusetts.
1. See generally 6-7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO
CEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1581-82, at 787-95, §§ 1651-52, at 260-68 (1971-72).
2. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (footnote omitted).
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under the other chum? The problem IS particularly acute when one
of the two clrums rests on the assertlOn of a constitutional nght. On
many occaSlOns, the United States Supreme Court and the high
est state courts have admomshed lower courts to decide non
constitutional clrums before they resolve constitutional ones, 3 so
that deCISions of far reachmg and Important constitutional Issues
are not made unnecessarily
With enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 4 these difficulties m awarding counsel fees m multl
clrum litigation mtensified. The 1976 Act authonzes state and fed
eral courts to award counsel fees to the prevailing party m cases
based on eight types of drums specified m the statute. The stat
utes covered by the 1976 Fees Act are the baSIC post-Civil War
Civil nghts acts, 5 two recent anbdiscnmmatIon provlslons, 6 and
certam actlOns under the Internal Revenue Code. 7 A great deal of
current Civil nghts and Civil liberties litigation IS mitIated under
one or more of these statutory proVlslons. Under present practice,
it IS also very common for plruntiffs to allege m their complamts ad
ditional drums based on federal or state law In some mstances, the
plruntiff may even seek to Jom additional defendants based on
clrums not withm the ongmal JunsdictIon of the federal court. 8
These "pendent drum or pendent party cases create additional
difficulties m the application of the 1976 Fees Act. 9
3. E.g., Hagans
Lavme, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Burton
United States, 196
U.S. 283 (1905); Donadio Cunmngham, 58 N.J. 309,277 A.2d 375 (1971); Binder
Tnangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971). Despite the settled rule,
lower courts continue to deCide constitutIonal questions when apparently dispOSI
tive non-constitutional grounds are available. See Ludtke
Kuhn, 461 F Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Webster
Redmond, 443 F Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
4. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). See generally Derfner, One Giant
Step: The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 441
(1977).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, & 1986 (1976). In the public law whICh enacted
the Fees Act, these prOVISIOns are referred to as they appeared m the REVISED
STATUTES, respectively, sections 1977 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981, because title 42
has never been codified. H.R. REP No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.5 (1976).
See also Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
6. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976); Ti
tle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976).
7 The Fees Act covers only tax enforcement actions brought by the United
States under the Code. See generally M. Derfner, The Civil Rights Attorney Fees
Awards Act of 1976, at 17-18 (1979) (to be published by the Practicmg Law Institute
February 1980).
8. E.g., Aldinger
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693 (1973).
9. For diSCUSSIOns of the relatIOnship between pendent claim and pendent par
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ThIS artIcle will focus on the applicatlon of the Fees Act m the
context of multI-clrum litigatIon where the Judgment rests on a
clrum not enumerated m the Act (the non-fee clrum") , even
though a vIOlabon of one of the covered statutes (the "fee clrum") IS
alleged m the complrunt. The subject IS diVIded mto two types of
multI-clrum cases: (1) Where the plruntiff's clrums mvolve both
constitutional and non-constitubonal Issues; and (2) where the
plruntiff's claIms mvolve only non-constitubonal consIderations. The
article will also discuss the constitutIOnal questions whIch the appli
catIon of the Fees Act raIses from both a federal and state court
perspective. Finally some attention will be prud to the potenbal
scope of the Fees Act m multI-clrum litIgatIon.
II.

COVERAGE OF THE

1976

FEES AWARDS ACT

On October 19, 1976, PresIdent Ford, a few hours before the
bill would have died by pocket veto, sIgned mto law the Civil
Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 10 Although the bill did
not generate a great deal of outsIde controversy as it moved
through the NatIonal Legtslature m the final days of the 94th Con
gress, it did create some turmoil mSIde the Congress. The bill
passed the Senate only after a detenmned effort by the leadershIp
and the chIef senatonal sponsors to break a filibuster by equally
detennmed opponents of the measure. l l After passmg the Senate
ty Junsdiction, see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent junsdiction, 77
COLUM. L. REV 127 (1977); Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pen
dent Party junsdiction, 125 U. PA. L. REV 1357 (1978); Note, The Concept of Law
Tied Pendent junsdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconsIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627
(1978); Note, Federal Pendent Party junsdiction and United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV 194 (1976); Note,
Pendent Party junsdiction: The DemIse of
Doctnne? 27 DRAKE L. REv 361
(1977-78).
10. Under the Constitution, the PresIdent has 10 days to veto
bill, unless
Congress has, m the mtenm, adjourned, m whICh case the bill automatically dies
(the pocket veto). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2. Although Congress adjourned on Oc
tober 1, 1976, the bill, S. 2278, was not presented to PresIdent Ford for hIS sIgnature
until October 9, and thus the 10 days did not start runmng until then. M. Derfner,
supra note 7, at 12-13.
11. Because of the filibuster, the Senate debated the measure from September
21 to September 29, 1976, the day the bill finally passed by a vote of 57-15. Derfner,
supra note 7, at 10-11. Ordinarily such late m the seSSIOn filibusters would be suc
cessful because of the need to complete the pending busmess, whICh usually piles
up m the weeks Immediately preceding an adjournment. In thIS case, Senate aIdes
reported, ASSIstant Majority Leader Robert Byrd and the chIef sponsors of the mea
sure refused to withdraw the bill because of the Impending retirement of Senator
Philip Hart and of Senator Hugh Scott, both long time CIvil nghts proponents. In
deed Senator Hart could no longer come to the Senate floor because of illness. Pur
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two days before the end of the seSSIOn, it reached the House floor
for final actIon only because the House leadershIp and sponsors
were equally detenmned to move the bill. 12 The measure passed
the House on October 1, 1976, the last day of the 94th Congress. 13
The 1976 Fees Act authonzes the state and federal courts to
award counsel fees to the prevailing party m litIgatIon under cer
tam specified sectIons of the United States Code. 14 The Act covers
suits brought pursuant to sectIons 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986. 15 SectIon 1981 prohibits, among other thmgs, discnmmatIon
on the baSIS of race or color m the makmg and enforcmg of con
tracts. 16 It IS used regularly to challenge raCIal discnmmatIon m
employment, although it IS not limited to the employment relatIon
shIp.17 SectIOn 1982 forbIds raCIal discnmmatIon m the sale or
rental of property and IS employed to challenge housmg discnmI
suant to the wlshes of Senators Hart and Scott and as
parting memonal to then
dedicated servlCe, the Senate leadershlp perslsted m getting the bill passed.
12. The efforts to pass the bill ill the House were equally dramatic as its JOur
ney through the Senate. On September 9, 1976, the House Judiclary Committee fa
vorably reported H.R. 15460, the House counterpart to S. 2278 (the bill whlCh
eventually became Public Law number 94-559). Id. at 9. Because the House Rules
Committee was no longer processmg any bills, except emergency measures, at that
pomt ill September, the House leaders declded to place the bill on the SuspenslOn
Calendar,
procedure whlCh permits the expeditious conslderation of non
controverslal" measures. Id. at 12. When bill on the Suspenslon Calendar lS con
sldered on the floor of the House, no amendments are permitted and passage lS
achleved only by two-thlrds vote. Because many measures were ahead of the attor
neys fees bill on the suspenSlOn calendar, the House never reached it on those few
days m September, 1976, when the House rules permitted votes on suspenSlOns.
When the Senate passed the bill on September 29, 1976 the House leaders realistic
ally had only one option: ask the Rules Committee to meet specially and to give the
bill
rule so it could be brought to the floor for action. After flurry of telephone
calls and with the necessary help from Speaker O'Neill, the Committee agreed to
meet m the early evenmg of September 30th (the Republican members of the Rules
Committee refused to attend, m part, because they did not like the timmg m
bnngmg the measure to the floor). With barely quorum present, the Committee ap
proved resolution (the rule") permitting the House to consider the Senate bill. Id.
13. After bill passes both houses, it must be enrolled" and otherwise pre
pared for the signature of the PreSident. In part because of backlog whICh occurs at
the end of seSSlOns of Congress, bills may not be sent to the White House for several
days after passage. In thiS case, nme days elapsed before S. 2278 went to Presldent
Ford. See note 10, supra.
14. Durmg the House debate, Representative Robert F Drman, the floor mana
ger for the bill, stated that it would be equally applicable m state courts as well as ill
federal courts. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976). E.g., Young
TOla, 66 App. Div 2d
377 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. 1979).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1986 (1976).
16. E.g., Johnson
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
17 E.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973)
(admlsslOn to recreational facilities covered by the statute).
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natIon. 18 Section 1983 IS by far the most wIdely used federal stat
ute when attackmg allegedly unconstitutional or otherwIse illegal
actIOn taken "under color of state law It IS used m a broad vanety
of CIvil nghts and CIvil libertIes cases,19 and IS not limited to litiga
tion mvolvmg raCIal, ethmc, or gender-based discnmmatIon. 2o Sec
tions 1985 and 1986 provIde a CIvil remedy for challengmg consplr
aCIeS, both public and pnvate, to depnve persons of the equal
protection of the laws. 21 The scope of these provisons IS presently
m a state of flux. 22
The Act extends also to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196423 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.24 Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 IS a general prohibition against
discrImmatIon on the baSIS of race, color, or national ongm" m
any program or activity whIch receIves federal finanCIal aSSIS
tance. 25 It reaches all reCIpIents of federal funds, whether or not
they are acting under color of law 26 Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, whIch was modeled after title VI, forbIds
certain federally aSSIsted educational mstitutIons from discnmmat
mg on the baSIS of sex, blindness, or severe VISUal ImpaInnent. 27
Finally certam lawsuits under the Internal Revenue Code are also
brought withm the pUrvIew of the statute by the Allen Amend
ment. 28
18. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Metropolitan Hous. Dev Corp., 429
19. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights
U.S. 252 (1977) (houslllg discnmmation); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (dismissal of school teacher for exerclSlng first amend
ment nghts of free speech); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school
segregation).
Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Young
Amertcan Mim The
20. E.g., Hutto
atres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (attack on local obscenity ordinance as overbroad and
vague).
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
21. E.g., Griffin
22. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Say & Loan Ass v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345
(1979).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976).
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976).
Bakke,
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see, e.g., Regents of the Umv of Cal.
438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hills
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); e.g., Laufman
Supp. 489 (S.D. OhIO 1976).
27 See, e.g., Cannon v. Umversity of ChICago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
28. Senator James Allen led the filibuster III the Senate agamst the Fees Act. In
part to termmate the extended debate over the bill, the chief sponsors agreed to
support hiS amendment whICh authOrized the award of attorney fees to the prevailing
party m tax enforcement cases brought by the United States. Derfner, supra note 7
at 11.

198

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 2:193

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEES ACT AS ApPLIED
IN MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION

The constitutionality of the 1976 Fees Act, as applied to multI
claIm litigatIon discussed m thIS artIcle, has not presented grave
problems for the courts. 29 Since a great majority of the cases
ansmg under the 1976 Act have mvolved state or local governmen
tal defendants, the decIded cases have focused on the validity of
the Act m that context. Two prmcipal grounds have been advanced
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act: (1) The Act contra
venes the eleventh amendment to the ConstitutIOn by mtruding on
state sovereIgn Immunity and (2) the statute exceeds the delegated
powers of Congress m permittmg fees to be awarded to a plamtiff
who prevails only on a state claIm. Each of these contentions will
be exammed m turn.
A.

The Eleventh Amendment Contention

State defendants have sought to challenge the statute on the
baSIS of the eleventh amendment, whIch protects the sovereIgn Im
munity of the states agaInst mtrusIOns by pnvate damage suits m
the federal courts. 30 The United States Supreme Court rejected
that attack on the Fees Act m Hutto v. Finney 31 In that suit, the
plaIntiffs, who had prevailed m litigation to correct unconstitutIonal
conditions m the Arkansas pnsons, moved for an award of attorney
fees agaInst the state offiCIals for legal expenses at the tnal and ap
pellate levels. The Court held that the eleventh amendment does
not bar an award of counsel fees. It affirmed the award for the
work performed m the tnal court based on the finding that the de
fendants had litigated III bad faith. For the legal serVICes proVIded
at the appellate level, the Court approved the award based on the
1976 Fees Act. 32
First, the Court stated that eleventh amendment sovereIgn
Immunity does not extend to the payment of litigation costs by
unsuccessful state offiCIals. For years, the Court had permitted the
29. E.g., Seals
Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cen. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979).
30. See Edelman
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court has sought to draw
line between Impermissible retroactive monetary relief, as In Edelman, and per
missible prospective relief even though it has
direct and substantial Impact on the
state treasury Milliken
Bradley 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977); accord, Quem
Jor
dan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
31. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
32. Id. at 689.
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assessment of costs agaInst such officIals notwithstanding the shield
of the eleventh amendment. 33 Since attorney fees are part of the
costs of the lawsuit,34 the eleventh amendment Imposes no bar to
their award. Second, the Court held that the Congress, under sec
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment, has the power to override the
Immunity conferred by the eleventh amendment. 35 The only ques
tion regarding any partIcular statute IS whether Congress Intended
to do so. In Hutto the Court found sufficient expressIOn of con
gressIOnal Intent In the legislative history of the 1976 Fees Act.
HaVIng determIned that Congress Intended to lift the bar of elev
enth amendment Immunity the Court upheld the award of counsel
fees to the plaIntiffs against state offiCials to be paid from the state
treasury
The deCISIon In Hutto did not address the eleventh amend
ment Issue In the context of pendent claim cases. In Hutto the
plaintiff asserted only constitutIOnal claIms. The lower federal
courts, however, both before and after Hutto have rejected sover
elgn Immunity defenses seekIng to aVOid fee awards agamst state
officlals. 36 These deCISIons have rejected the eleventh amendment
defense whether the plaintiff prevailed on a federal statutory or
state law ground. 37 The courts have not Imposed a more stnngent
test of congressIOnal Intent to abrogate sovereign Immunity In
awarding fees on prevailing pendent claims, state or federal, than
on prevailing constitutional claIms. 38 Any doubt on the abrogation
33. Fairmont Creamery Co.
Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455 (1976), for
35. It relied upon an earlier case, Fitzpatnck
the proposition that Congress, under section five, may abrogate state sovereign Im
munity In Bitzer male plaintiffs sued to enJOin state offiCials from discnmInating on
the baSIS of sex In the operation of retirement benefits plan. After they prevailed,
the plaintiffs sought to recover their attorney fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976). The Court held that congressIOnal
power under section five may override eleventh amendment sovereign Immunity.
Lower courts disagree whether congressIOnal exercise of other delegated powers,
such as under the copynght and patent clause, IS adequate to abrogate eleventh
amendment Immunity. Compare Mills MUSIC, Inc.
Anzona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Congress has the authority to overnde) with Wihtol
Crow, 309 F.2d
777 (8th Cir. 1962) (Congress does not have the power to overnde).
36. E.g., Seals
Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979).
37 E.g., Seals
Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Gagne
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979).
Redman, 474 F Supp. 511 (D. Del. 1979) (action by state
38. E.g., Anderson
pnsoners at Delaware Correctional Center to alleViate overcrowded conditions alleg
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questIon should be resolved In favor of awarding fees to prevailing
plaIntiffs because the legIslatIon should be liberally construed. 39

B.

The Delegated Powers Argument

The other possible line of constitutIOnal challenge would anse
most starkly In those suits In whIch the case IS disposed of on a
state law ground to whIch the Fees Act does not expressly apply
In these cases, fees are awarded because of the presence of an
unresolved federal constitutIOnal Issue whICh has been pretermitted
In favor of deCIding the case on the non-fee claim. The argument
would be that Congress does not have the power to authonze the
award of fees when a plaIntiff, assertIng both constitutIonal and
state law claIms, prevails only on the latter. The Issue may be di
vIded Into two parts: (1) When the multI-clrum actIOn IS brought In
federal court, and (2) when the actIOn IS brought In state court.
1.

Federal Court Suits

Any diSCUSSIOn of the constitutIOnality of awarding fees to suc
cessful plaIntiffs who prevail on non-fee state law claims must begIn
with the baSIS of federal court JunsdictIOn over such suits. In
United Mme Workers v. Gibbs 40 the Supreme Court reformulated
the test for eXerCISIng pendent JunsdictlOn over non-federal"
clrums upon the proposition that all of a plamtiff's related claIms
constitute one constitutional case " withm the meamng of article
111.41 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that to exerCIse Junsdic
tIOn over pendent, non-federal claims, a federal court must find: (1)
The federal claim asserted IS suffiCient to confer subject matter JU
nsdictIon, and (2) both federal and non-federal claims denve from
a common nucleus of operatIve fact. "42
edly m VIOlation of constitutIOnal and state law proSCrIptions); see Seals v. Quarterly
County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th CiT. 1977); Gagne
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d CiT.),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979); cf Corpus V. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th CiT. 1979)
(rejected the defendants argument that strIct test of constitutionality should be ap
plied In determInmg the scope of congressIOnal power under section five of the four
teenth amendment to authorIze fees for legal services rendered prIor to the effective
date of the act).
39. As the Court noted In Hutto "[tlhe act could not be broader. 437 V .5. at
694. See note 166 tnfra.
40. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
41. See text accompanymg notes 59-77 mfra. Commentators who believe Gibbs
IS
unconstitutionally over-expansive may also find the Fees Act beyond congres
SIOnal power. Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent JUrisdiction: Gibbs and
Aldinger ReconSIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978).
42. 383 V.S. at 725.
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The premIse of Gibbs IS that, if the litIgatIon presents only
one constitutIOnal case under artICle III, Congress may gIVe the
federal courts the power "to decIde all the questIons m the case
and to dispose of it on local or state questIons only "43 If Congress
has the power under article III and the necessary and proper
clause to gIVe such JunsdictIon to the federal courts, then it may
also provIde whatever remedies are necessary to encourage or facil
itate the mvocatIon of that JunsdictIon by plamtiffs. To effectuate
the JunsdictIOnal grant, Congress may adopt appropnate means to
facilitate the exerCIse of that JunsdictIon. 44 When state law claIms
are properly Jomed to federal constitutIonal Issues, it IS appropnate
for Congress to Implement the sensitIve JudicIally-created doctnne
that non-constitutIOnal claIms should be deCIded first to aVOid un
necessary constitutIonal declslonmakmg. To advance both of those
permIssible goals, Congress may enact an attorney fee statute
whIch authonzes fees to a plaIntiff who prevails on the non-fee,
state claIm.
In additIon, the constitutIOnal claIm, whICh provIdes the baSIS
for federal court JunsdictIon, IS rooted m the fourteenth amend
ment and asserted through the remedial prOVlSlon of sectIon
1983. 45 Under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress
may enact appropnate legislatIon, such as sectIon 1983, to enforce
the guarantees of that amendment. 46 ProvIding attorney fees when
plaIntiffs prevail on those constitutIonal claIms IS withm the grant
of power under sectIOn 5. The questIon here IS whether that grant
extends to the non-fee, state claIm when Congress, recogmzmg the
pendent JunsdictIOn doctrme and the policy of aVOiding unneces
sary constitutIOnal decIsIons, authonzes the applicatIOn of the Fees
Act to the plaIntiff who prevails on the state claIm.
In definmg the scope of congreSSIOnal power under sectIon 5,
the Supreme Court has adopted the clasSIC formulatIon artIculated
m M'Culloch v. Maryland 47 to determme the reach of other dele
gated powers: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be withm the
scope of the constitution, and all means whICh are appropnate,
whICh are plamly adapted to that end, whIch are not prohibited,
but conSIst with the letter and SpIrit of the constitutIOn, are con
43.
44.
45.
46.
U.S. 445
47

Siler v. LOUIsville & N.H.H., 213 U.S. 174,191 (1909).
See Tennessee v. DaVIS, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatnck
(1976).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

Bitzer, 427
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stitutIonal. "48 The attorney fee provlSlon satIsfies the applicable
standards for legtslatmg under sectIon 5 so long as the non-fee,
state chum properly relates to the federal constitutIOnal clrum. That
relatIonshIp IS satIsfied through the applicatIOn of the Gibbs two
pronged test of substantIality and common nucleus of operatIve
fact. 49
2.

State Court Suits

The constitutIOnal Issue m state court litIgatIOn IS sImilar to
the claIm regarding federal courts with the added wrmkle that the
pendent JunsdictIon argument, fully applicable m the federal
courts, must be recast to fit the state court model. The adjust
ments, although distmctIve, are not really maJor. Although Con
gress has authonzed the state courts to hear federal constitutIonal
clrums, it recogmzes that aVOIding a deCISIon on those clrums IS de
SIrable if a non-constitutIonal ground IS dispositIve. To accomplish
the dual goals of encouragmg the advancement of constitutIonal
nghts and aVOIding unnecessary decISIons mterpretmg the ConstI
tutIOn, Congress may encourage state court plruntiffs to Jom poten
tIally dispositIve state clrums to theIr constitutIonal clrums. ProVld
mg attorney fees to the prevailing plruntiff IS one reasonable means
of accomplishmg those twm goals.
It should also be borne m mmd that under Testa v. Katt,50 the
state courts have a constitutIonal duty to adjudicate federal clrums
at least when they entertam SImilar state clrums. To aSSIst the state
courts m meetmg that duty Congress has the power to authonze
counsel fees even on the state clrum. In Thiboutot v. State 51 the
Mame Supreme JudicIal Court held that, although Congress did
48. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (quoting M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44
49. Gagne
(1979); accord, Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977). See
Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979) the court
generally note 126 mfra. In Corpus
of appeals rejected the contention that, III determmmg the constitutionality of stat
ute Imposmg fees on state offiCials, the court should apply
stnct standard for
evaluating whether gIVen means IS plamly adopted to constitutIOnal end. Id. at
177. Indeed the court suggested that the defendant must show unconstitutionality
"beyond reasonable doubt" m attackmg statute passed under section five of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 180.
Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442
50. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But see Chamberlam
S.W.2d (1969) (Tennessee state courts are not obliged to entertalll actIOns based on
§§ 1983 and 1985 (3)).
51. 405 A.2d 230, 239 (Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460 (Jan. 22,
1980) (No. 79-838).
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not reqmre the state courts to apply the 1976 Fees Act, Mame
state courts should apply it as a matter of sound policy because of
the deslrability of uniform remedies throughout the nation m clvil
nghts actions. In Thiboutot, the tnal Judge entered Judgment for
the plamtiffs without specifymg whether it rested on state or fed
eral grounds. The Mame Supreme Judiclal Court stated that Con
gress had sufficlent power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to authonze the award of such fees if a sectlOn 1983
clrum lS available as a basls for the Judgment.
Furthermore, the plenary power of Congress to adjust the JU
nsdictIon of state and federal courts with regard to cases and con
troverSles withm article III has been recogmzed from the begm
nmg and has never been senously quesboned. 52 The exerClse by
state courts of the authority to award fees m thls context may be
Viewed as one of the conditions Congress has placed on thelr
power to adjudicate federal constitutlOnal clrums. 53

IV

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

It frequently occurs that plruntiffs will seek to Jom all of thelr
clalms agrunst the defendant m one action, m either federal or state
court. For example, m Lau v. Nichols,54 the plamtiffs, represenbng
a class of Chmese school children, sued San Franclsco public
school officlals m federal court to compel them to provlde adequate
bilingual education. The plruntiffs asserted several clrums agrunst
the defendants based on the fifth, mnth, and fourteenth amend
ments to the United States ConstitutlOn, provlSlons of the state
constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Education Code of Califorma. Similarly m Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Townshtp of Mount Laurel,55 the plruntiffs sued
m state court to enJom the defendant's zonmg ordinance because it
allegedly excluded low and moderate mcome housmg. They as

52. See generally note 185 mfra.
53. Since "[t]he power of Congress to make exclUSive [in the federal courts]
any valid grant of Junsdiction has hardly been m Issue, it would appear that Con
gress could properlv condition state court exercise of authority over federal claims
with an attorney fee proVISIOn. P BATOR, P MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 418 (2d
ed. 1973) [heremafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
54. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
55. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismIssed, cert. dented, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
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serted claIms based on the equal protection clause of the state and
federal constitutIons and on the New Jersey zomng enabling stat
ute. In Washmgton v. Davts,56 the plaIntiffs Instituted a federal
court action challengmg, as raCIally discnmInatory the hmng prac
tices of the DIstnct of ColumbIa police department. They alleged
claIms based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
sectIon 1981 of title 42, and the DIstnct of ColumbIa Code.
In these illustrative cases, the plaIntiffs challenged the defen
dants conduct on several grounds, each of whICh was adequate to
support a Judgment m plaIntiffs favor. If the 1976 Fees Act had
been public law at the tIme these cases were decIded, it would
have applied expressly to one or more, but not all of the claIms al
leged by the plaIntiffs. If those law suits had tennmated m favor of
the plaIntiffs on a ground or grounds not explicitly covered by the
Fees Act, they would have presented the Issue to whIch thIS artIcle
IS addressed.
CongreSSIOnal proponents of the Fees Act recognIZed that
multI-claIm litIgatIon Involvmg both fee and non-fee claIms mIght
be resolved on a ground not covered by the Act eVen though a
covered claIm was also available as a baSIS for dispOSIng of the case.
To deal with that questIon, the House JudiCIary Committee In
cluded a footnote In its report whICh sought to address that Issue
and to gIVe gmdance to the courts when confronted with such
cases. 57 It should be noted that the footnote In the House report IS
the only reference m the entIre legIslatIve hIstory whIch speaks to
that Issue. Because of the Importance of that text to our diSCUSSIOn,
it IS quoted In full here:
To the extent a plallltiff Joms a chum under one of the statutes
enumerated m H.R. 15460 [the House eqmvalent of the Senate
bill whIch became the public law] with a claIm that does not al
low attorney fees, that plaIntiff, if it prevails on the non-fee
claIm, IS entitled to a determmatlOn on the other claIm for the
purpose of awarding counsel fees. Morales v. Hames 486 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1973). In some mstances, however, the chum with
fees may lllvolve a constitutIOnal question whICh the courts are
reluctant to resolve if the non-constittmonal [SfC] claIm IS disposl
hve. Hagans v. Lavme, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). In such cases, if
the claim for whICh fees may be awarded meets the substantial
ity test, see Hagans v. Lavme, supra; United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), attorney s fees may be allowed even
56.
57

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7.
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though the court declines to enter Judgment for the plamtiff on
that chum, so long as the plamtiff prevails on the non-fee chum
ansmg out of a common nucleus of operative fact. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, supra at 725. 58

ThIS language m the House Report addresses two distinct cate
gones of cases whICh anse m multI-claIm litIgatIon. The first cate
gory encompasses those suits m whIch none of the claIms mvolves
a questIon of federal constitutIOnal law That IS, all of the claIms m
volve Issues of federal statutory or common law or Issues ansmg
under state law (constitutIOnal, statutory or common). The first
sentence of the footnote m the House Report, quoted above, was
desIgned to address that type of case. The second category em
braces those multI-claIm lawsuits m whIch one or more but not all
of the claIms IS based on a prOVISIon of the federal constitutIOn. Be
cause of the rule whICh reqmres that non-constitutIonal, dispositIve
claIms be resolved before reachmg the constitutIOnal Issue, m
many cases the constitutIOnal questIon will never be decIded. The
second and thIrd sentences of the footnote seek to establish a rule
of decIsIon for thIS kmd of case. ThIS artIcle will exam me both cate
gones of cases whICh anse m federal and state courts. The federal
court decIsIons will be exammed m part V and the state court cases
m part VI.
V

MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

The Doctnne of Pendent ]unsdictwn
Any diSCUSSIOn of attorney fee awards m multIple claIm cases
m federal courts must begm with an exammatIon of the pendent
JunsdictIon doctnne. The modem doctnne of pendent JunsdictIon
traces its lineage at least to Osborn v. Bank of the United States,59
deCIded by the Supreme Court m 1824. In that case, the Bank of
the United States sued OhIO offiCIals m federal court to restraIn
them from collectmg a tax levIed on the bank by the OhIO legIsla
ture. Notwithstanding a federal court mJunctIon restrammg the en
forcement of the state taxmg act, the defendants seIzed $100,000 of
the bank s assets to satIsfy the assessment. The bank amended its
complamt to seek recovery of the seIzed funds on the ground that
A.

58. Id.
59. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS § 19, at 72 (3d ed. 1976); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary JUriS
diction: Towards SynthesIs of the Two Doctnnes, 22 U CAL. L. A. L. REV 1263
(1975).
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the statute taxmg the bank was unconstitubonal on the authority of
M'Culloch v. Maryland. 60 Wribng for the Court, ChIef Jusbce
Marshall expansIvely defined the scope of the ansmg under" JUns
dicbon of artIcle III:
We thmk, then, that when a question to whICh the Judicial
power of the Umon IS extended by the constitutIOn, forms an m
gredient of the ongInal cause, it IS m the power of Congress to
gIVe the [Federal courts] JUrIsdictIOn of that cause, although
other questions of fact or of law may be mvolved mit. 61

Although the case may be read as raIsmg no state law Issues at
all,62 later decIsIons relied m part on the Marshall dicta to extend
federal court Junsdicbon to embrace clrums separately grounded m
state and federal law
In Hurn v. Oursler 63 for example, a leading case decIded a
few years before the adopbon of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure, the plamtiff sued to enJom the defendants from producmg a
play whICh the plruntiff clrumed mfrmged its copyrIght. The com
plrunt alleged a VIOlatIOn of the federal copynght statute and a state
unfrur competibon law The tnal court dismIssed the federal copy
nght clrum on the merits and the state unuur competitIon claIm for
want of JunsdictIon. The Supreme Court affirmed, but modified,
the lower court Judgment dismIssmg the state clrum on the merits,
not for want of JunsdictIOn. The Court distInguIshed, for federal
60. 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
61. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823.
62. In related case decided on the same day as Osborn, the plalntifT Bank ap
parently relied entirely on state law for its claims against the defendant based on as
signed promissory notes. Bank of the United States
Planters Bank of Ga., 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 904 (1924). Furthermore, In his dissenting opinIOn In Osborn, Justice
Johnson charactenzed the complaint of the Bank as nothing more than traditIOnal
common law action for trespass or to recover illegally seized property both of whICh
were governed by state, not federal law. Osborn
Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871. Apparently Justice Johnson Viewed the federal question (Le.,
the unconstitutionality of the state law taxing the Bank) as entenng the case only bv
way of replication by the Bank to defense based on the state statute. In later years,
the Court held that the general federal question JunsdictlOnal statute, enacted In
1875, did not authonze federal courts to entertain suits In which the federal question
arose by way of rejOinder to an anticipated defense. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S.
586 (1888); accord, LOUisville & N.R.R.
Mottley 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The Metcalf
OpinIOn, however, did not address the scope of the anslng under language In arti
cle III, the question to whICh the Marshall dicta IS directed. See Railroad Co.
MiSSISSIPPI, 102 U.S. 135 (1880) (under the 1875 statute, the federal court has Juns
diction of case removed from state court where the federal question anses by way
of the defense).
63. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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JunsdictIOnal purposes, cases m whIch state and federal grounds
are asserted m support of a smgle cause of action from those suits
m whICh the state and federal grounds constitute "two separate and
distinct causes of action. "64 In Hurn, the Court held that the plam
tiff had merely alleged two separate grounds, one based on federal
law and the other on state law m support of a smgle cause of ac
tion. It concluded that the lower federal court had Junsdictlon
over the state and federal clrums and should have decIded both.
The Court added, however that the federal court did not have
pendent JunsdictIon over the plamtiff's state unfaIr competitIOn
clrum ansmg out of defendant's use of an uncopynghted, unpub
lished verSIon of the copynghted play because thIS clrum was sep
arate and distinct" from the JunsdictIOn-confernng federal copy
nght clrum. By tymg federal JunsdictIon over non-federal clrums to
the notion of a smgle cause of action," the Court created a rule
whICh the lower federal courts struggled with followmg the deCI
SIon m H urn 65
AdoptIon of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure m 1938 lrud
the groundwork for a redefinition of the scope of the federal Judi
Cial power m cases mvolvmg federal and non-federal questIons. 66
Among other thmgs, the rules merged law and equity mto one CIvil
actIon,67 proVIded for liberal Jomder of claIms and partIes,68 and ef
fected other reforms rumed at litIgatmg all clrums among the parties
In one law suit. 69 In 1966, the Supreme Court relied heavily on
64. Id. at 246. The Court abjured defimng cause of action In terms of the
facts necessary to establish the claIm. See generally, Note, The Concept of Law-Tied
Pendent Junsdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconsIdered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978). It
did, however, underscore that the claIms of mfnngement and unfaIr competition so
precIsely rest upon IdentIcal facts as to be little more than the eqUIvalent of different
epithets to charactenze the same group of cIrcumstances. 289 U.S. at 246. Earlier m
the OpinIOn, the Court also found that the two grounds were dependent upon the
same facts. Id. at 244. ThIS focus on the facts would later proVIde, perhaps unwit
tingly the underplnmng for the Court' reformulation of the pendent Junsdiction
doctnne m requmng that the claims anse out of
common nucleus of operative
fact. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (emphaSIS added).
65. "By the first thIrd of the 20th century however, the phrase [cause of actIOn]
had become so encrusted with doctrmal complexity that the authors of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether.
DaVIS v. Passman, 99 S. Ct.
2264, 2272 (1979). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 19, at 73; Comment,
supra note 59.
66. UMW
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 717 (1966).
67 "There shall be one fonn of action to be known as CIvil actIOn.
FED. R.
Crv P 2.
68. Id. 18 (JOinder of claIms and remedies); Id. 20 (pennlsslve Jomder of par
ties); Id. 21 (mlsJomder and non-JOInder of partIes).
69. FED. R. Crv P 13 (counterclaim and cross-claIm); Id. 14 (thIrd-party prac
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the modermzatIon of the federal rules of practice when it re
formulated the doctrme of pendent junsdictIon. In the semmal
case of Untted Mine Workers v. Gibbs 70 the Court noted the diffi
culties expenenced by the lower federal courts m applymg the
Hum cause of action doctnne. Refernng to the rules and the
tendency of its earlier cases to reqUlre a plamtiff to Jom all related
claIms m one action, the Court held that junsdictIon, m an article
III sense, eXIsts if the relationshIp between the federal and state
claIms permits the conclUSIOn that the entIre actIOn before the
court compnses but one constitutional case. "71
After surmountmg the constitutional objection to a more ex
panSIve VIew of pendent junsdictIon, the Court m Gibbs artie
ulated the critena by whICh to determme, m any gIven suit,
whether the federal and state claIms do mdeed constitute one
constitutional case.
With the vaganes of cause of action un
doubtedly m mmd, the Court adopted a two-pronged test to deter
mme when non-federal claIms (those whICh do not have an mde
pendent baSIS for federal junsdictIon) may properly be asserted m
federal court.72 First, the federal claIm whICh prOVIdes the mde
tice); Id. 15 (amended and supplemental pleadings); Id. at 22 (interpleader); Id. 24
(interventIon); Id. 42 (consolidation).
70. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
71. Id. at 725. Although the Gibbs opmlOn IS vulnerable on several grounds,
perhaps its most obvIOUS flaw IS the Court' reversal of the usual analYSIS whICh ad
dresses statutory Issues before exammmg constitutlOnal questions. See generally
Shakman, The New Pendent JUrisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV 262
(1968). PrIor to determInIng the scope of the word case m article III, it should
have studied the Junsdictional statute to see whether Congress mtended to confer
pendent JUrIsdictIOn and m what measure. If the statutory grant reached the state
claim, only then would it be necessary to deCIde whether that grant was withIn the
confines of article III. One commentator has suggested that Aldinger may have un
dermIned Gibbs by reqUirIng the plamtiff affirmatively to show that Congress m
tended m the JUrIsdictIOnal statute to permit the assertion of the particular pendent
claim m question. Aldinger
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Comment, Aldinger v.
Howard and Pendent JUrisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV 127 (1977). The thrust of
Aldinger as later amplified by the Court m Owen EqUip. & Erection Co.
Kroger,
437 U.S. 365 (1978), does not, In thiS author Judgment, go quite that far. Rather
Aldinger and Kroger appear to create presumption m favor of pendent JUrIsdiction
whICh IS rebutted by showmg that Congress mtended to exclude particular pen
dent claim or party from the scope of federal JUrIsdiction.
72. A lively debate has developed over whether the Gibbs test IS two-pronged
or three-pronged. It has arIsen because JustIce Brennan, after noting the substantI
ality and common nucleus factors, added: "[blut if, considered without regard to
thelf federal or state character, plamtiff' claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all m one Judicial proceeding, then, assummg substantiality
of the federal Issues, there IS power m the federal courts to hear the whole. 383
U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted) (emphaSIS m ongmal). Two distingUished commenta
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pendent baSIS for JUrIsdictIon must have substance sufficient to
confer subject matter junsdictIon. "73 Second, the federal and non
federal claims must denve from a common nucleus of operatIve
£ac.t "74
Eight years later the Court clarified the first branch of the test
by explicatmg more preCisely what it meant by a claim of suffi
cient substance. In Hagans v. Lavtne 75 the Court SaId thiS
standard reqUIred only that the federal claim be one that IS not
obVIOusly fnvolous, or absolutely devOId of merit, or wholly
msubstantIal. "76 The relatIvely low quantum of "federalness" needtors relYIng on the ordinarily be expected to try language, maintain that thiS ele
ment IS cumulative to the other two factors. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, §
3567, at 445; accord, Note, Pendent Party JUrisdictIOn: The DemIse of Doctrine?
27 DRAKE L. REV 361, 364-65 (1977-78). But other commentators are equally certain
that Gibbs announced only
two-pronged test, with the above quoted sentence
servIng as an alternative formulation. E.g., Baker, Toward Relaxed View of Federal
Ancillary and Pendent JUrisdiction, 33 U PITT. L. REV 759, 764-65 (1972); accord,
Comment, supra note 59, at 1272. ThiS author agrees with the view that Gibbs
adopted
two-pronged test simply because, In the critical sentence quoted above,
Justice Brennan repeats the reference to the substantiality test, thus suggesting
that the ordinarily be expected to try standard IS alternative. In any event, as the
legislative history of the Fees Act demonstrates, Congress adopted
two-pronged
test, based on its understanding of the Gibbs-Hagans line, for the purpose of
awarding attorneY fees, not to determine Junsdiction. Thus it makes no difference for
present purposes what the Court really Intended In Gibbs.
73. 383 U.S. at 725.
74. Id.
75. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
76. Id. at 536-37 (quoting from line of its earlier declSlons). When the defen
dant moves to dismiSS the complaint because the federal questIOn IS "insubstantial"
or "fnvolous the court, In ruling on that motion, looks only to the plamtiff' allega
tions. Rosado v. Wvman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Thus the plaIntiff need not demon
strate Junsdiction over the pnmarv claim at all stages as prereqUisite to resolution
of the pendent claim. [d. at 405 (footnote omitted). ThiS approach IS little more than
an application of the well-pleaded complaint" rule whICh the Court has applied to
resolve subject matter Junsdiction questions. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.
Red
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (Junsdictional amount); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S.
586 (1888) ("ansIng under questions); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537
(1824) (diversitv of citizenship). In each case, the Court held that Junsdiction de
pends on the state of things when the action IS brought. Osborn
Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824. That after vesting, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent events. Mollan
Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 539 (1824); accord,
Mosher v. City of Phoemx, 287 U.S. 29 (1932) ("JunsdictlOn IS thus determined by
the allegations of the [complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or by deCI
sIOn of the merits Id. at 30). In view of proVISIOn In the JudiCiary Act of 1875, the
rule might have been the other way that IS, that federal court Junsdiction could be
ousted by subsequent events. JudiCiary Act of 1875, Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Section
five of the 1875 Act reqUired dismissal of suit commenced In Federal court at any
time after such suit IS brought" if it does not really and substantiallv Involve
dispute or controversy properly within the JunsdictlOn of the court. Id. § 5 (empha
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ed to satIsfy thIs mInImal reqmrement led JustIce Rehnqmst In hIS
dissent to characterIze the standard as permittmg JUrIsdictIon
whenever the "plaIntiff IS able to plead hIS claim with a straight
face."77
B.

Pendent Junsdiction and the 1976 Fees Act

Although the Gibbs case Involved a state claim pendent to a
federal statutory claIm 78 and Hagans mvolved a federal statutory
SIS added); see Gold-Washing & Water Co.
Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877) (dictum)
(federal court suit may be dismissed if it later appears that disposition of the case
does not depend upon the construction of federal law or the Constitution). Even
though that language remained In the United States Code until 1948, when it was re
moved as unnecessary the Supreme Court nonetheless adhered to the well
pleaded complaint" rule through those years. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53,
at 837
The Supreme Court has also held, however, that other JUrisdictional attacks,
such as the absence of Justiciable controversy (e.g., standing to sue or mootness),
remain open throughout the litigation and are subject to later developments. E.g.,
County of Los Angeles v. DaVIS, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness). The Court appar
ently has not reconciled these disparate rules regarding challenges to federal court
JUrisdiction, except to advance the suggestion In Rosado, that substantiality differs
from mootness because of the timing element. 397 U.S. at 403. A distinctIOn be
tween the two categories of cases may be drawn along constitutional lines. Cases
involVing attacks on ,the JUrisdictional amount, for example, do not Implicate article
III limitations, but merely congressIOnal policy Judgments. In contrast, defense that
the action IS not
case or controversy I.e., JustiCiability within the meanmg of ar
ticle III Implicates the scope of the constitutional grant of power. But even that dis
tinction loses its force when it IS recalled that federal courts, which are created by
act of Congress, must look to the statute as the warrant for their authority' certainly
they cannot go beyond the statute, and assert an authority with whICh thev may not
be Invested by it, or whICh may be clearly demed to them, Cary
Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
77 415 U.S, at 564. Because he thought the JUrisdiction-conferring constitu
tional claim was so weak and msubstantial, Justice RehnqUist qUipped that "thiS
seems to be claSSIC case of the statutory tail wagging the constitutional dog. Id.
Indeed some of the earlier precedents reqUired that the federal question be real
and substantial, whICh seemed to Impose something more than the mlmmal test of
Hagans. McCam
DesMomes, 174 U.S, 168, 181 (1899). The formulation In McCain
denved from the general federal questIOn JUrisdictional statute, enacted In 1875,
whICh authOrized the federal tnal courts to dismiSS an ongmal suit or remand re
moved suit to the state court if "it shall appear to the satisfactIOn of said [federal]
court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit
does not really and substantially mvolve
dispute or controversy properly withm
the JUrisdiction of Said [federal] court. The JudiCiary Act of 1875, Ch. 137 § 5, 18
Stat. 470, 472 (emphaSIS added). Although thiS prOVISIOn was omitted from the 1948
recodification of the JudiCial Code as unnecessary the federal courts continued to
apply the substantiality test after 1948. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 837
(quoting from the legislative hlstorv of the recodificatIOn). Perhaps that omiSSIOn un
derlays Justice Harlan observation that the standard IS
maxim more ancient than
analytically sound. Rosado
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
78. 383 U.S. at 715.
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chum pendent to a federal constitubonal claIm,79 the standard un
der the 1976 Fees Act does not draw any distmcbons among the
different types of cases whICh mIght arIse under the pendent JUrIS
dicbon doctrIne. 8o The 1976 Act adopts the two-pronged Gibbs
test, employed to determme pendent JUrIsdictIon, only as a rule for
the courts to apply m awarding fees m mulb-clalm litIgatIon
mvolvmg a federal constitubonal Issue. Whether the non-con
stitutIOnal Issue has an mdependent JunsdictIonal baSIS IS totally Ir
relevant for purposes of awarding counsel fees. Thus, fees may be
awarded if the plamtiff prevails on a non-fee claIm, whether it
arIses out of state law or federal statutory or common law so long
as it IS properly Jomed with a federal constitutIOnal claIm.
The SIgnificance of thIS pomt should not be underestImated
because it IS not uncommon for non-constitutIonal claIms 10 multI
claIm litigatIon to have an mdependent JunsdictIOnal base. Nothmg
m the legislatIve hIstory of the Fees Act mdicates that Congress at
tributed any SIgnificance to the reality that some non-constitutIonal
claIms could stand alone as a baSIS for federal court JUrIsdictIon.
Congress adopted the pendent JunsdictIon test for fee awards to
accommodate the congressIOnal policy of promotmg pnvate en
forcement of the cIvil rIghts acts and the JudicIal policy of not un
necessarily deCIding federal constitutIonal Issues. 81 In thIS sense, it
may be SaId that "the House report strikes a sensible and reason
able balance between two Important federal poliCIes. "82
C.

Multi-Clatm LitlgatIOn Not Involvtng ConstitutIOnal Issues

When conduct IS challenged as vIolatIve of one of the statutes
covered by the Fees Act and no constitutIonal claIm IS mvolved, it
IS not uncommon for the plamtiff to assert additIonal federal
or state claIms whICh do not have attorney fee prOVlSlons. The
questIon arIses whether counsel fees may be awarded when the
case IS deCIded on the non-fee claIm. With respect to the scope of
federal court JUrIsdictIon, the Gibbs-Hagans doctrme applies to al
low the plamtiff to Jom claIms whICh do not have an mdependent
baSIS of JUrIsdictIon. 83 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court authOrIzed the
79. 415 u.s. at 528.
80. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
81. Gagne
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979);
see White v. Beal, 447 F Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
82. Southeast Legal Defense Group
Adams, 436 F Supp. 891, 895 (D. Or.
1977).
83. 415 U.S. at 528; 383 u.S. at 715.
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Jomder of a state law claim, whICh could not otherwIse be brought
m federal court, to a federal statutory claIm whICh was properly m
the federal court. 84 In Hagans the Court, relymg on Gibbs ap
proved the Jomder of a dependent federal statutory claim to an m
dependent (JurIsdichon-conferrmg) constitutIOnal claIm. 85 Thus, so
long as the plamtiff can satIsfy the two critena of the Gibbs-Hagans
test, she may Jom other federal and state claIms whICh do not have
mdependent JUrIsdictIonal bases.
The first sentence of footnote 7 m the House Report seeks to
provIde a governmg standard for determmmg whether fees should
be awarded m thIs category of cases when the Judge, or JUry de
CIdes the case on the non-fee claIm.86 In these cases, smce no con
stitutIonal questIon IS mvolved, the court IS free to decIde the case
on any or all grounds. It may gIve complete relief on one ground,
pretermittmg declSlon on the other claIms. If the plamtiff, how
ever, prevails on a non-fee claIm alone, she "is entitled to a deter
mmatIon of the [fee] claIm for the purpose of awarding counsel
fees."87 Because the fee claIm does not mvolve any constitutIonal
84. 383 U.S. at 715.
85. 415 U.S. at 528.
86. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7
87 Id. The first sentence of the footnote relies on Morales
Hames, 486 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1973), remanded, [1974] EQ. OPPTY. IN Hous. (P-H) ~ 13,677 at 14,383
(N.D. Ill. 1974), as authority to support the policv requIrIng the Judge to decide the
fee claim covered by the Act if the Judge IS mclined to dispose of the case on the
non-fee claim (in cases where neither claim Involves
constitutional question). In
Morales, black plamtiff sued local offiCials to enJom ban on the construction of
federally subSidized housmg, allegmg racial and economic discnmmatlOn m VIOla
tion of constitutional and statutory proscnptions. The tnal Judge held that the con
struction ban constituted "financial discnmmatlOn m vIOlation of the equal protec
tion clause. Id. at 881. He made no finding of racial discnmmation, denvmg the
plamtiff any damages or attorney fees. Id. at 882. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
held that the distnct court should have decided the racial discnmmation claim be
cause plaintiff' request for damages and counsel fees depended on it. Id. It re
manded the case for that detennmation, whICh the Judge ultimately made m the
plamtiff' favor by awarding damages and fees. [1974] EQ. OPPTY. IN Hous. (P-H) ~
13,677 at 14,383 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Techmcally, the tnal court should never have de
Cided the constitutional claim before addressmg the statutory claims. If that tradi
tional path had been followed, the question In Morales would not have ansen be
cause at least two of the statutory claims were "fee-claims. The Supreme Court
eventually disapproved that part of Morales whICh relied on the pnvate attorney
general" exception to the Amencan Rule forbidding attorney fees unless unauthor
Ized by statute. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Corp.
Wilderness Soc v, 421 U.S. 240, 270
n.46 (1975). In any event, the congressIOnal purpose, m referencmg Morales, IS to
give the plamtiff the nght to deCISion on her fee claim whenever the tnal court
may dispose of the case on non-fee ground. See Save Our Sound Fishenes Ass
Callaway 429 F Supp. 1136 (D.R.1. 1977) (in deciding the case on the merits, the
court found it unnecessary to detennme whether it had Junsdiction of claims based
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Issue, it may be decIded without VIolence to the federal policy
agamst decIding constitutIOnal questions when non-constitution
al grounds are dispositIve. 88 No cases have been decIded under
the 1976 Fees Act whICh mvoke thIs branch of the fee-non-fee
problem.
An mterestmg line of deCISIOns IS developmg, however,
whIch IS related to thIs category of cases. Bunn v. Central Realty
of LOUlszana 89 IS illustrative. In thIs case, the plamtiff sued the
defendant for raCIal discnmmatIon m housmg, basmg hIS chums on
sectIOn 1982 and the Federal FaIr Housmg Act. 90 The distnct court
found discnmmatIon, but did not mdicate whICh statutory prOVlSlon
the defendant VIolated. The Judge demed plamtiff's motion for
counsel fees because under the Federal FaIr Housmg Act only
plamtiffs who are not finanCially able to assume Said attorney s
fees may recover them. 91
The court of appeals reversed the demal of attorney fees. It
held that the distnct court should have awarded them under the
1976 Fees Act because the plamtiff had alleged and proved a VIOla
tion of sectIon 1982, one of the statutes covered by the legIslation.
FOllowmg the legIslatIve hIstory and its pnor declSlons under the
1976 Act, the court further held that counsel fees should ordinarily
be awarded unless speCIal CIrcumstances render the award un
JUst. 92 Even though the FaIr Housmg Act demes fees to a plamtiff
on two environmental statutes; when the prevailing plaintiff applied for counsel fees,
however, the court then deCided the Junsdictional question under the envIronmental
laws because they were the only claims under whICh the plaintiff could recover its
attorney fees).
88. Southeast Legal Defense Group
Adams, 436 F Supp. 891, 895 (D. Or.
1977). It should be noted that, even though the fee may techmcallv be awarded on
the baSIS of the covered" claim, the plaintiff may still be able to recover fee for
the time spent on the non-fee claim. See generally note 130 and accompanvlng
text mfra. Because of the "interrelated nature of the claims, it may be difficult In
some cases to Isolate the time spent on the "fee-claim. Lund v. Affieck, 442 F
Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.R.I. 1977). Where there IS no Indication at all In the statute
authonzlng fee award nor m its legislative history that Congress mtended to en
courage JOinder of fee and non-fee claims, the courts will exclude from the attorney
fee computatIOn the amount of time devoted to, for example, non-covered state law
ground. E.g., Baughman
Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.
1978) (plaintiff who was successful on Sherman Act antitrust claim cannot recover
counsel fees for time spent on related state law claim).
89. 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979); accord, Dillon v. A.F.B.I.C. Dev. Corp., 597
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979).
90. 592 F.2d at 892.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
92. The strong presumption In the 1976 legislation authonzlng fees to pre
vailing plaintiff IS based In part on Supreme Court deCISIOns. Northcross v. MemphiS
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who can afford them, the Fifth Circuit said that ability to pay does
not qualify as specIal cIrcumstances under the 1976 legIslatIon.
Bunn and the related cases m thIs line of precedent hold that,
even though one or more of the plamtiff's claims may be covered
by other fee prOVISIOns, the courts should apply the more liberal
standards of the 1976 Fees Act whenever the plaintiff prevails on a
claim covered by it. 93

D

Multt-Clatm Littgatwn Involvtng Constitutwnal Issues

The second category of cases to be explored mvolves those m
whICh one or more of the plamtiff" s claims rest upon a nght se
cured or protected by the United States ConstitutIon, while other
claims are non-constitutIonal m nature. These cases are, of course,
limited to those suits m whICh the defendants are public offiCIals or
other persons actmg under color of state law 94 Although each of
the statutory proVISIOns covered by the 1976 Fees Act mIght be
available m some state actIon cases, sectIon 1983 IS the most fre
quently mvoked of these prOVlSlons when challengmg the constitu
tIOnality of conduct taken under color of state law Because of its
breadth and frequency of mvocatIon, thIS diSCUSSIOn will focus on
that prOVlSlon of the CIvil nghts laws.
The archetypal sectIon 1983 case IS a suit m whIch welfare re
CIpIents are challengmg a local or state eligibility rule denymg
them some benefit as vIOlatIve of the Federal SOCial Security Act
(and Implementmg regulatIons) and of the equal protectIon or due
Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggle Park Enterpnses, Inc., 390 U.S.
400 (1968).
93. See note 89 supra. See also Hughes
Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978);
Wharton
Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977). Cj Johnson
Snyder, 470 F Supp.
972 (N.D. OhIO 1979) (VIOlation of FaIr Housmg Act and 1866 Civil Rights Act);
White
Ed Miller & Sons, Inc., 457 F Supp. 148 (D. Neb. 1978) (discharge from
employment due to race). Contra, Crumble
Blumenthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir.
1977).
94. Although thiS article has assumed that the rule contamed m the second and
thIrd sentences of footnote seven of the House Report would apply onlv m actions
asserting constitutional claims agamst public offiCIals or other persons acting under
color of law it may be that the rule will also applv to actions agamst pnvate persons
under § 1985(3). See note 58 supra; see text accompanymg note 21 supra. The argu
ment would proceed somethmg like thiS: T the extent that the scope of the four
teenth amendment nghts IS one element of § 1985(3) claim, as some courts have
held, then the determmation of that element would mvolve the deCISion of
constI
tutional" question withm the meanmg of the second and third sentences of footnote
seven. See note 57 supra. In such mstances, the court should pretermit that determi
nation if the case can be disposed of on wholly non-constitutional ground.
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 95 In earlier years, the
tYPICal case mvolved a pnvate company attackmg a state agency
rate-fixmg order as vIOlatmg state law and the fourteenth amend
ment. 96 It has long been the rule that, m such mstances, the fed
eral courts should decIde the non-constitutIonal federal or state
claims before reachmg the constitutional Issues. 97 "It IS not the
habit of the court to decIde questions of a constitutIonal nature un
less absolutely necessary to a decIsIOn of the case. "98
To date, the federal cases decIded under the Fees Act have m
volved non-constitutIonal claims ansmg from both state and federal
sources. The rule of deCISIOn for awarding attorney fees set out m
the House Report does not distmgUIsh between dispositive claIms
based on state or federal law For purposes of awarding attorney
fees m this type of multi-claim litigatIOn mvolvmg a federal consti
tutional Issue, the House Report lumps together the cases m
volvmg non-constitutIOnal federal claIms with those rooted m state
law What the report does do, however, IS adopt as the rule of de
CISIOn the test for pendent junsdictIon, formulated by the Supreme
Court m the Gibbs and Hagans cases to determme when federal
court plamtiffs may attach to theIr junsdictlOn-confernng claIms
other contentions, either state or federal, whICh do not have an m
dependent baSIS of junsdictlOn.
1.

Related Federal ClaIms

Before discussmg the key cases that have been decIded under
the Act on this pomt, it IS Important to note one other considera
tion that affects the applicatIOn of the pendent junsdictIOn doctnne
to the award of counsel fees under the 1976 Act. Many suits
agamst non-federal governmental officials and others actmg under
color of state law are based on section 1983, a remedial prOVISIon
95. E.g., Rosado
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Hagans v. LaVine, 415 U.S.
at 528.
96. Siler v. LOUisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
97 Id., accord, CinCinnatI
Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930); TownshIp of
Hillsborough
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946). State courts have embraced the
same rule when deCIding federal constitutional Issues In theIr tribunals. E.g.,
Donadio
Cunmngham, 58 N.J. 309, 277 A.2d 375 (1971) (constitutional question IS
not to be deCIded unless absolutely Imperative In the disposition of the litigation");
Binder v. TrIangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1973) (constitutional
Issues should not be resolved if it IS not essential to determinatIon of the case).
United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1904); accord, 415 U.S. at 528 (non
98. Burton
constitutional federal statutory ground); Siler
LOUisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175
(1909) (non-constitutional state law ground).
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whICh authonzes suits for the depnvatIon of nghts, pnvileges, or
ImmunitIes secured by the ConstitutIon and laws.
"99 The re
cent declSlon of the Supreme Court m Chapman v Houston Wel
fare Rtghts Orgamzatwn lOO makes it perfectly plam that thIs provI
sIon IS not the source of any nghts, but IS merely a remedial deVIce
to gIve plamtiffs a nght of actIon for certam vIOlatIons committed
by persons actmg under color of state law Although on numerous
occaSiOns In the past the Court has assumed that the phrase and
laws" In sectIon 1983 creates a pnvate nght of actIon for the viOla
tIon of any federal statute,101 five of the JustIces In Chapman ap
parently believed that the questIOn was not yet settled. 102
In contrast, the federal and state appellate courts expressly ad
dressmg that questIon have uniformly held that sectIon 1983 au

99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
100. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hagans v. Lavme, 415 U.S.
101. E.g., Edelman
at 528; Rosado
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Citv of Greenwood
Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966). But cf Great Am. Fed. Sav & Loan Ass n
Novotny 99 S. Ct. 2345
(1979).
102. Justice Stevens, writmg for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices Rehn
qUist, Blackman, and Powell, was willing only to accept without deCiding that the
petitioners are correct m assertmg that § 1983 proVides cause of action for all fed
eral statutorv claims. 441 U.S. at 617 In hiS concurrmg opmlOn (for himself, the
Chief Justice, and Justice RehnqUlst), Justice Powell held that and laws was
"intended as no more than shorthand reference to the equal nghts legislation en
acted by Congress. [d. at 624. In contrast, four Justices (Justice White concurnng,
and Justice Stewart, for himself. Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall, dissenting)
stated theu view that § 1983 does embrace, as
general matter, federal statutorY
nghts. [d. at 672. In footnote (from whICh Justices Brennan and Marshall disasso
Ciated themselves), of hiS dissenting opmlOn, Justice Stewart stated: "When state
offiCial IS alleged to have VIOlated federal statute whICh proVides its own compre
henSive enforcement scheme, the reqUirements of that enforcement procedure may
not be bypassed by bnngmg suit directly under § 1983. [d. at 673 n.2. That state
ment became the premise for Justice Stewart' majority opmlOn 111 Great Am. Fed.
Sav & Loan Ass v. Novotnv 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (§ 1985(3) which denves from
the same post Civil War statute as § 1983, does not proVide remedy for certam VIO
lations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Whether the Novotny deCISIOn
will proVide the baSIS for limiting the reach of § 1983 when federal statutorY nghts
are mvolved IS, of course, unclear at thiS pomt. In dictum several vears ago, the
Court mdicated that nghts created bv Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (public
accommodations) could not be asserted through § 1983 because Congress mtended
title II to be the exclUSive remedv Adickes
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
n.5 (1970). But see United States
Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (title II mav be the
source of nghts to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976), the cnmmal counterpart of §
1983). In Gagne
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979),
and Thiboutot
State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460
(Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-838), the Supreme Court presently has the opportunitv to ad
dress the question whether and to what extent § 1983 reaches statutory claims.
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thonzes pnvate suits based on federal statutes agamst persons act
mg under color of state law 103 The legIslatIve history of the 1976
Act mdicates that Congress was well aware of these lower court de
CISIOns. RepresentatIve Robert Dnnan, the floor manager of the
bill m the House, stated: "Under applicable JudiCIal deCISIons, Sec
tIon 1983 authonzes suits agamst State and local officIals based
upon Federal statutory as well as constitutIonal nghts. "104 Similarly
the Senate Report noted the availability of sectIon 1983 m suits
redressmg vIOlatIons of the Federal ConstitutIon or laws. "105 The
legIslatIve hIstory also con tams several mdirect references to the
authority under sectIOn 1983 to mitIate suits based on federal statu
tory vIOlatIons. lOS Thus, In those cIrcuits where sectIon 1983 has
103. Tongol
Usery 601 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1979) (action bv beneficlanes of
federal unemplovment compensation law challenging the legality of federal regu
lation forbidding states to waive recoupment of overpaid benefits); Chase
McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 965 (1978) (action by
tribal Indian against local offiCials for refUSing to connect her property to water and
sewer lines In VIOlation of federal statute; ill dictum, the Court suggested that § 1983
may not cover all federal statutes); Gonzalez
Young, 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977)
(action bv welfare reCIpient, based on Social Securitv Act, that state defendants iIIe
Comne, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir.
gallv demed her emergencv assistance); Sanders
1974) (action bv person In custody against state offiCials alleging vIOlation of the
federal extradition statute); Blue
Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974) (action bv
welfare reCIpients, under Social Security Act, challenging the failure of public offi
Cials to reimburse their transportation expenses In seeking medical assistance);
Gomez
Flonda State Emplovment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (action by
migrant workers against state offiCials and pnvate persons for VIOlating the Wagner
Peyser Act whICh provides standards for wages and working conditions); Bomar
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947) (action bv school teacher alleging unlawful dis
missal because of her federal JUry servICe, based on proVISIOn In an Act to codify re
Vise, and amend the laws relating to the Judiciary of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 275,
State, 405 A.2d 230
36 Stat. 1165 (formerlv codified at 28 U.S.C. § 411)); Thiboutot
(Me. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3460 (Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-838) (action
challenging state welfare regulation redUCing method of calculating payments as VIO
lative, Inter alia, of federal welfare regulations); see Bond
Stanton, 555 F.2d 172,
174 (7th CiL 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (in deciding whether fees
should be awarded under the 1976 Act In an action based on the SOCial Securitv Act,
the Court noted congressIOnal Intent "that the [Fees] Act extend to statutory claims
asserted under § 1983"); Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974) (per
cUriam) (the Court assumed that § 1983 created pnvate nght of action for VIOlations
of the SOCial Security Act). Contra, Wvnn
Indiana State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 316
F Supp. 324 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (action bv welfare recIpients based on SOCial Security
Act mav not be brought pursuant to § 1983).
104. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976) (At that pOint In the debate, Rep. Robert
Drlnan cited with approval the deCISIon In Blue
Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir.
1974)).
105. S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprillted III [1976] 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911-12.
106. See 122 CONGo REC. 35128 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John Seiberling, the
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been held to authonze suits based on statutory nghts, the courts
would not have to apply the two-pronged test set out m the House
Report to award counsel fees because the plamtiff would have pre
vailed on a chum ansmg under section 1983, a statute expressly
covered by the Fees Act.
The early declSlons under the Fees Act followed thIS reason
mg. In Gary W v. LOUlStana,107 the plamtiffs represented a class
of children no longer m the custody of theIr parents, either be
cause of a court order or because the parents had voluntarily
permitted the state to assume custody The suit attacked the condi
tions at the resIdential facilitIes to whICh the children had been as
sIgned, espeCIally those located beyond the borders of LOUISIana.
The plamtiffs rested theIr clatms upon the equal protectIon clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the SOCIal Security Act through
whICh the state receIved funds for the proper care of the foster
children. The plamtiffs moved for an award of attorney fees after
the suit concluded m their favor based upon a federal statutory
clatm.
Similarly m La Raza Untda v. Volpe 108 an organIZatIon of
MexlCan-Amencans sued state and federal offi.ctals to enJom the
constructIOn of a hIghway whlCh would displace them from theIr
homes. The plamtiff alleged several clrums based on the federal
constitutIon, federal statutes, and state law The distnct court IS
sued a prelimmary mJunctIon based on a federal statutory clrum
whIch was affirmed on appeal. After the appellate deCISIon, the
plans for the hIghway "laId largely dormant."109 The plruntiff then
moved for an award of attorney fees. In both Gary Wand La Raza
Untda, the distrIct courts held that section 1983 authonzed pnvate
suits to enforce federal statutory nghts, and that Congress mtended
the 1976 Fees Act to cover such suits. Counsel fees were awarded
m both mstances. DeCISIons subsequent to these cases have fol
lowed thIS approach, although not always expressly 110
It may be, however that the Supreme Court will eventually
hold: (1) SectIon 1983 does not create a nght of action for VIOlations
chIef sponsor of SImilar bill, In support of S. 2278); 122 CONGo REC. 33312-14
(1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, one of the Senate floor leaders for the
bill).
107 429 F Supp. 711 (E.D. La. 1977).
108. 440 F Supp. 904 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
109. Id. at 906.
110. E.g., Gates
Collier, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977); Bond V. Stanton, 555
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
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of federal statutory nghts; or (2) it covers only equal nghts legIsla
tion enacted by Congress .111 or (3) it does not even cover "equal
nghts statutes whICh contam a detailed admInIstrative and Judi
cial process deSIgned to provIde an opportunity for nonjudicIal and
nonadversary resolution of claIms. "112 At such time, or m those Clf
cuits where section 1983 has been so limited, the courts will need
to follow a three-step process m awarding fees under the Act
where federal constitutional and statutory claIms are Jomed to
gether m one action. First, the court will have to deCIde whether
the statute whICh allegedly IS the source of the plamtiff's claim pro
vIdes, expressly or Impliedly a nght of action. 113 Second, it must
deCIde whether it has JunsdictIon over that claIm, either through
the pendent JunsdictIon doctnne or by an mdependent grant m
the JudiCIal Code. ThIrd, if the court disposes of the case on the
non-constitutional statutory ground, then it will have to apply the
two-pronged test for awarding fees set out m the House Report
(whether or not the statutory claim rests on an mdependent Juns
dictional ground).
2.

Related State Claims

(a)

Background

Frequently a plamtiff will seek to Jom a state claim to her
federal constitutIOnal claim m a federal court. Over 70 years ago,
the Supreme Court, without reference to the Osborn case, to ar
tIcle III, or to the JunsdictIonal statute, approved the practice m
Siler v. Loutsville & Nashville Railroad. 114 In that case, the plain
tiff railroad company sued to enJom a maxlffium rate order of the
Kentucky Railroad CommIssIon, allegmg that it Violated several
proViSIons of the federal Constitution and exceeded the authority
conferred upon the CommISSIon by the state enabling statute. The
lower federal court ruled for the plamtiff based on its con
sitututIonal claims.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment below solely on
Ill. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights OrgamzatlOn, 441 U.S. 600, 624
(1979) (Powell, J., concurnng).
Il2. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass
Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2349 (1979).
Il3. See generally Cort Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Compare Cannon v. Umver
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) with Touche Ross & Co.
Redington, 99 S.
Ct. 2479 (1979) and Transamenca Mortgage AdVisors, Inc. (TAMA)
LeWIS, 100 S.
Ct. 242 (1979).
Il4. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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the basIS of the state law ground, whICh the tnal court did not
reach, rather than to unnecessarily decIde the vanous constitu
tional questions appeanng m the record. "U5 It held that federal
courts, once they acqmre JunsdictIon over a suit, had the nght to
deCIde all the questions m the case and may dispose of the litiga
tion on local or state questions only "116 Foreshadowmg the hold
mg m H urn 117 the Court noted m dictum that the tnal court could
also have disposed of the case on the state law ground even
though it deCIded the federal questions adversely to the party raIS
mg them."u8 Through the years, the prmcipies of Siler have not
been disturbed. As noted earlier m discussmg Gibbs the only ad
Justment has been to expand federal JunsdictIon by liberalizmg the
test for Jommg pendent clrums.

(b)

ApplicatlOn of the Rule

Because state clrums are not covered expressly by the Fees
Act, it becomes necessary to determme whether and under what
CIrcumstances counsel fees may be awarded m the Siler-type case
m whICh a state law claim IS Jomed to a federal constitutional
clrum. As preVIOusly noted, the House Report provIdes that fees
may be awarded m cases like Siler where the court disposes of the
suit on the state law ground, while pretermittmg the federal consti
tutional Issues. Congress adopted the two-pronged test of pendent
U5. Id. at 193. Over 20 years earlier, the Court had adopted Similar approach
when state law and federal constitutional questions anse by way of defense m suits
removed from state to federal court. Santa Clara County
Southern P.R.R., U8
u.S. 394 (1886). "These questIOns [mvolvmg fourteenth amendment claims] belong
to class whlCh thiS court should not deCide unless theu determmation IS essential
to the disposal of the case III whlCh they arise. Id. at 410. In Santa Clara, the Court
pretennitted the constitutional questions, deCiding the case on state law grounds III
favor of the defendant.
U6. 213 U.S. at 191. It appears that Siler was the first case III whlCh the Su
preme Court squarely addressed the Issue whether, m an orlgmal suit filed III fed
eral court based on federal question JUrisdiction, the plamtifT may append related
state claim and have Judgment on it. Much earlier, however, the Court had approved
such practice m cases removed from state court to federal trial court. See Railroad
Co. v. MiSSISSIPPI, 102 U.S. 135 (1880). Percelvlllg no distinction between orlgillal
and removed suits for JUrisdictional purposes, federal cucuit court could, m 1887,
confidently assert: "It IS the settled law of the supreme court that, when case IS
presented mvolvmg federal question, the Junsdiction of the court attaches to the
whole case, and IS not limited to the mere decIsIOn of that smgle federal question.
Omaha Horse Ry
Cable Tram-Way Co., 32 F 727 729 (D. Neb. 1887) (footnote
omitted).
117 289 U.S. at 238.
118. Id.
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Junsdichon for applicatIOn of the Fees Act m thIS context. 1l9 But
unless the defendant failed to move to dismISS for lack of Junsdic
tIon, the court, by the tIme the case concluded, will have already
applied those standards In takmg JunsdictIon over the state claIm at
the outset of the litIgatIOn. Thus, if the court enters Judgment for
the plaIntiff on the state claIm, the award of fees should follow
automatIcally because the court has already applied the Gibbs
Hagans test. That IS, the distnct Judge will have determIned that
the plaIntiff" s constitutIonal claIm IS not InsubstantIal" and that the
constitutIOnal and state claIms anse out of a common nucleus of
operatIve fact. "120
In an early and leading Siler-type case under the Fees Act,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit essentIally
followed that line of reason mg. In Seals v. Quarterly County
Court 121 black plamtiffs sued to enJom an at-large system of appor
tIonment for seats on the Quarterly Court, the elected governmg
body for countIes m Tennessee. The plaIntiffs alleged that the plan
diluted mmority votIng strength m vIOlatIon of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments to the United States ConstitutIon. The dis
tnct court dismIssed the complamt for failure to state a claIm, a
Judgment whIch was reversed by the court of appeals. 122 When the
tnal Judge agam dismIssed the complaInt on the merits after re
mand, the court of appeals agaIn reversed. 123 On thIS occaSIOn, the
appellate court reserved decIsIon on the constitutIonal questIons to
permit the plamtiffs to attack the validity of the apportIOnment
plan based on state law as mterpreted by a recent declSlon of the
Tennessee Supreme Court. On the second remand, the distnct
Judge mvalidated the plan based on state law but ruled agaInst the
plaIntiffs on theIr federal constitutIonal claIms. The court also
demed request for an award of counsel fees.
The plaIntiffs took theIr thud appeal to the Sixth Circuit, thIS
tIme on the attorney fee Issue. First, the court held that the dis
tnct Judge should not have deCIded the federal constitutIOnal Issue
because the state law ground was dispositIve. Second, it recogmzed
the difficulty of the attorney fee Issue, but noted the explicit lan
guage m the House Report addreSSIng that questIon:
119. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7· see generally text accompanymg notes
78-82 supra.
120. UMW
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
121. 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977).
122. 496 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1974).
123. 526 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Nonetheless, the language [of the House Report] appears to us
to be a clear-cut mdicatlOn that Congress considered the exact
problem with whICh we are now confronted and provided an ex
press mdicatIon as to how the general language of the 1976 stat
ute was mtended to be applied. Under such circumstance (rela
tively rare m thiS court's expenence), we, of course, follow con
gressIOnal mtent. 124

It then proceeded to apply the two-pronged test, notmg that it had
already discussed that Issue m its opmIOn on the second appeal.
The court thus repeated its prevIous holding that the plamtiffs
constitutIonal claIms were substantIal" and that the federal and
state claims arose out of a common nucleus of operatIve fact. "125
Havmg made that determmatIon, as it were for the second time, it
held that attorney fees were appropnate under the 1976 Act. The
court remanded the case for the thIrd tIme to the distnct judge to
assess the amount of the fees.
Despite the certainty with whICh the court of appeals reached
its conclusIOn based entIrely on the legislatIve hIstory of the Act,
one commentator has observed that "it IS unlikely that Congress m
tended the fee prOVISIon to be used m thIS manner "126 That obser
vatIon does not take full account of the legIslatIve hIstory relied on
by the Sixth Circuit, especIally the references to the Gibbs case m
footnote 7 of the House Report. In relymg on the Gibbs standards
for pendent junsdictIon, the Congress recognIzed that state claIms
are properly withm the parameters of the pendent junsdictIon doc
trme as well as federal statutory claIms under Hagans The Seals
court found that reference to be a clear-cut mdicatIon that Con
gress mtended the courts to award fees to prevailing plamtiffs m
the Siler-type case. 127 Any suggestIon that Congress did not so m
tend IS a mIsreading of the legIslative hIstory
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
followed the Seals case m Siler-type litIgatIon. In Kimbrough v.
Arkansas Actzmtres Assoczatwn,128 a black hIgh school student sued
to enJom the defendant aSSOCiatIOn from preventIng hIm from
playmg football. The student alleged that the eligibility rule of the
asSOCIatIon vIolated the equal protectIon and due process clauses of
124.
125.
126.
Fees Act,
127
128.

562 F.2d at 394.
Id. at 392.
Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judiclal Response to the Civil Rights Attorney
22 ST. LoUIS U.L.I. 243, 248-49 n.35 (1978).
562 F.2d at 394.
574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978).
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the fourteenth amendment, and sectIon 1981 of title 42. In
grantIng a prelimmary mJunctIon, the distnct court held that, be
cause the defendant's eligibility rule was ambIguous, the plamtiff
was not barred from playmg football. DeCIding the case on thIS
state" law ground, the Judge did not reach the plamtiffs federal
constitutIonal or statutory clalms. It demed, however, the plaln
tiff s request for counsel fees because the plamtiff did not prevail
on a clalm covered by the 1976 Act.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the demal of counsel
fees. It applied the two-pronged test of substantiality and com
mon nucleus set out m Seals and m the House Report, whICh the
court SaId contamed an unambIguous expreSSIOn of congreSSIOnal
mtent. "129 With regard to these standards, the court of appeals
noted that the distnct court had Implicitly made the appropn
ate determmatIons because it disposed of the case on a non-federal
ground. Thus Kimbrough, like Seals, applied the Fees Act m a rel
atively automatic fashIOn because the two-pronged test had already
been satisfied when the distnct court asserted JunsdictIon over the
non-federal claIm and deCIded the case on that ground.
While the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits have followed the congreSSIonal rule,130 one dis
tnct court has deVIated from it. In Martm v. Hancock,131 the
plamtiff sued three Mmneapolis police officers under sectIOn 1983
for illegal arrest, unreasonable force m makmg the arrest, and fail
mg to keep a police dog under control. The JUry found for the
plamtiff on the last claim and awarded hIm $2,500. The Judge
demed a request for counsel fees, charactenzmg the case as "no
129. Id. at 427.
130. 574 F.2d at 423; 562 F.2d at 390. A more subtle question, whICh will not
be explored at length m thiS article, IS whether the court, m calculating the counsel
fee to be awarded the plamtiff, should mclude the time spent on the constitutional
Issue even though it did not prOVide baSIS for the judgment. There IS dictum m
Brown
Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978), whICh states that the tnal
judge should mclude such time otherwise the plamtiff would be penalized for as
serting constitutional nght. Putting aSide those multi-claim cases mvolvmg consti
tutional nghts, the defendants have argued unsuccessfully for
per se rule whICh
would forbid compensating the plamtiff for legal services on claims whICh do not
support the judgment. Although the courts have rejected an absolute rule, they have
stated that "the degree to whIch counsel prevailed In the lawsuit has become factor
m determmmg the appropnate amount of attorneys fees to be awarded. Jones
Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphaSIS In ongmal); accord, Brown
Bathke, 588 F.2d at 634 (so long as claim IS not "fnvolous, the plamtiff may receive
some compensation for the legal work underlymg it); cf Dawson
Pastnck, 600
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979) (plamtiff need not prevail on all Issues to recover fees).
131. 466 F Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979).

224

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:193

more than a common law negligence dogbite case, clothed as a
sectIon 1983 constitutIonal claIm. "132 That holding mIsreads the
legIslatIve hIstory of the Act, for nowhere does it gIVe the court dis
cretIon to pIck and choose among the kmd of VIOlatIons protected by
sectIon 1983 for whIch fees may be awarded. But more Important
for our purposes here, even if the claIm upon whIch the JUry re
turned its verdict IS properly charactenzed as a common law negli
gence claIm, the Fees Act would still be applicable because the
plamtifI alleged a sectIon 1983 constitutIOnal claIm whIch the Judge
could find to be "not msubstantIal, and arose out of a common
nucleus of operatIve fact. "133
On the other hand, cases like Martin 134 lend some support to
the fears expressed by the defendant III Seals (and m Siler and
Gibbs) that the federal courts will now become the forum for
"purely state litigatIon whenever the defendants have acted under
color of law 135 The Sixth Circuit III Seals rejected that argument
because it believed the two-pronged test provIded a suffiCIent safe
guard. 136 But if JustIce Rehnqmst IS nght that all the plamtiff need
do IS plead hIS [constitutional] claIm with a straIght face,"137 then
perhaps those safeguards will not deter the "federalizmg" of nearly
132. Id. at 456; cf Zarcone
Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (in af
firmmg denial of attorney fees m case where Judge ordered vendor arrested
and handcuffed for servmg putnd" coffee, the court of appeals charactenzed the
plamtiff' case as an essentially pnvate Injury echOing the distnct Judge descnp
tion of it as "baSically tort action for false arrest and Impnsonment couched In the
language of the constitutional nght to due process. Zarcone
Perry, 438 F Supp.
788, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). T the extent that cases like Zarcone and Buxton v. Patel,
595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979), have denied prevailing plaintiff an award of attorney
fees because the damage remedy was suffiCient to attract competent counsel, those
deCISIons are contrary to the legislative history of the Fees Act. "Of course, it should
be noted that the mere recovery of damages should not preclude the awarding of
counsel fees. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 8; accord, Sargeant
Sharp, 579 F.2d 645
(1st Cir. 1978). For
critical diSCUSSIOn of the Zarcone case, see Note, The Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN S L. REV 562, 579-83
(1978).
133. That the case ultimately may be deCided by JUry should not obscure the
analYSIS. The question whether pendent Junsdiction eXists IS legal Issue to be de
Cided, if raised by the defendant, by the Judge at an early stage m the litigation.
Thus, at the time the Jury returns verdict for the plamtiff, the court will have al
ready applied the two-pronged test, or if not, the defendant will have waived it.
Rosado
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Mollan
Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537
(1824).
134. 466 F Supp. at 454.
135. 562 F.2d at 394.
136. See generally note 132 supra and accompanymg text.
137 415 U.S. at 564 (RehnqUlst, J., dissenting).

1979]

MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION

225

all chums agamst state or local officIals or others actmg under color
of law 138
(c) Abstentwn

Before concluding thIs discussIOn, one other problem should
be noted. When the state claIm, whIch IS pendent to a federal
constitutIonal claIm, lOvolves an unsettled or novel questIon, the
federal court may be reqUIred to abstalO" from decIding it while
the partIes repaIr to the state court for a definitIve ruling on the
state law Issue. 139 If the state court deCISIon disposes of the case
(or even if it does not), the questIon arIses whether the federal
plamtiff may recover counsel fees for the expense of the legal ser
VIces rendered m the state proceeding or m the federal proceeding
prIor to the abstentIon order Although no case has been found
whICh explicitly addresses thIS POlOt under the 1976 Fees Act, the
deCISIOn m Chance v. Board of Exammers 140 does, without much
diSCUSSIOn, examlOe part of the problem. The Chance litIgatIon
challenged as unconstitutIonal the selectIon procedures for supervI
sory employees m the New York City school system. The plamtiffs
138. Although thls diSCUSSIOn has focused on the award of fees m pendent
claim cases ansmg under § 1983, word should be sald about so-called pendent
party suits, matter whiCh the Supreme Court has charactenzed as
subtle and
complex question with far-reachmg lmplications. Moor
County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693, 715 (1973). See generally note 9 and accompanymg text supra. Many of the
pendent party problems under § 1983, thought to be created by Aldinger
Howard,
427 U.S. 1 (1976), have largely disappeared m the wake of Monell
Dep't of Soclal
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It lS possible, however, that some problems linger m the
post-Monell world. Assume, for example, that plamtiff asserts
§ 1983 constitu
tional clalm agamst one defendant and pendent state or federal clalm agamst both
defendants. Assume further that the plamtiff prevails on the pendent clalm. May the
plamtiff now recover counsel fees agamst both defendants? Since the leglslatively
detennmed rule of declsIOn under the Fees Act lS directed only at claIms, the an
swer would seem to be yes. See Holley v. Lavme, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979) (in an
action by an "illegal" alien challengmg the calculation and reduction of welfare ben
efits, fees were awarded agamst state as well as county officlals based on pendent
clalm, even though the plamtiff asserted no mdependent basls of Junsdiction agamst
the state defendant). So long as one clalm ralses constitutional question and the
other lS non-constitutional m nature, the two-pronged test would apply even though
the constitutional clalm lS asserted agamst only one defendant. The premlse of the
Fees Act, as it was of Gibbs, lS that the entire litigation (pendent claims, pendent
parties, and all) constitutes one constitutional case,
and the Fees Act should be
applied accordingly
139. Railroad Comm
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The federal plam
tiff may, of course, reserve the federal questions for later declslOn by the federal
court after completion of the state proceeding. England
Loulslana State Bd. of
Medical Exammers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
140. 561 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
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prevailed m the early stages of the law suit and received theIr
counsel fees. The later stages of the litIgatIOn focused on the nature
and scope of permanent prospectIve relief. UltImately the partIes
offered the distnct Judge two alternatIve plans for resolvmg the re
lief questIon and disposmg of the litIgatIon. Neither optIon ratsed
any federal constitutIonal Issue, but the plan approved by the dis
tnct court raIsed senous Issues under state law The court of ap
peals reversed the distnct court Judgment on the ground that the
resolution of the state law questions should be determmed by the
state courts. It ordered the distnct Judge not to deCIde the state
law Issues, remittmg the parties to the state courts to contest any
permanent plan put mto effect by the defendants. 141 After remand,
the platntiffs moved for theIr counsel fees under the 1976 Act. The
distnct court demed an award because the platntiffs did not "pre
vail" m light of the court of appeals direction to relinqmsh Junsdic
tIon over that part of the case. 142
In additIon to the Chance case, closely analogous authority IS
available. In Brown v. Bathke 143 an unmarned teacher brought
suit m federal court agamst public school offiCIals for dismIssmg her
from her Job when she became pregnant. After she prevailed on
her procedural due process clatm, she moved for an award of attor
ney fees under the 1976 Act, mcluding the cost of legal aSSIstance
m proceedings before a state human nghts agency and m the state
courts. 144 The federal Judge made a partIal award for the cost of le
gal services at the state level, whICh the court of appeals affirmed
without much diSCUSSIOn, except to note that a prevailing plamtiff
under the 1976 Act may recover counsel fees for servIces prOVided
"in other related proceedings. "145
Similarly m Carey v New York Gaslight Club Inc. 146 the
plamtiff filed a complamt with the United States Equal Employ
ment Opportunity CommISSIon (EEOC) under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, allegmg raCIal discnmmatIon m the refusal
of the defendant to hue her as a waitress. Under the federal stat
ute, the EEOC IS reqmred to refer the complamt to the state Civil
141. Id.
142. 472 F Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
143. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978).
144. It is unclear from the opmlOn how the state proceedings began. The plam
tiff may have filed discnmmation complamt with the state human nghts agency, or
she may have filed one with the federal agency, which m turn deferred to the state
forum.
145. 588 F.2d at 638.
146. 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979).
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nghts agency if it provIdes comparable remedies as the federal law
In thIS case, the EEOC referred Ms. Carey s complamt to the ap
propnate New York agency whIch eventually found discnmmatIon.
Shortly before the New York appellate court affirmed the agency
order 147 the plamtiff filed suit m the federal court seekmg an
award of attorney fees mcurred before the state agency The dis
tnct Judge demed the application, whiCh the court of appeals re
versed. It held that the attorney fees prOVlSlon m title VII, whIch
applies to any actIOn or proceeding under the statute, authonzes
an award for the legal servIces rendered before the state agency to
whiCh the plamtiff was reqmred to go under the law 148 The key
statutory words or proceeding," upon whiCh the court of appeals
m Carey relied, are also found m the 1976 Fees Act, whIch em
ploys the same phrase, any actIon or proceeding. "149
In contrast, a distnct Judge has refused to award counsel fees
for legal servIces rendered m related state proceedings. In
Burchett v. Bower 150 the plamtiff commenced an action m federal
court to restram state offiCIals from transfernng hIm back to pnson
from a state mental health hospital where he had been sent for
treatment. The plamtiff claImed that the defendants should not af
fect the transfer without gIvmg hIm a hearmg on the question
whether the medical treatment has been completed. The distnct
Judge awarded the plaIntiff counsel fees under the 1976 Act for
prevailing on hIS section 1983 claIm m the federal court. The
Judge, however refused to make any award for the related state
proceedings on the ground that he had no way of evaluatmg the le
gal servIces rendered m the other forum.
While title VII reqmred the plamtiff m Carey to proceed
through the state agency it IS not clear from the declSlons m
Brown and Burchett why those plamtiffs made appearances m state
forums. In any event, the results m Brown and Carey rest on a
firmer footmg than the deCISIOn m Burchett and should be applied
to fee claIms under the 1976 Act by federal plamtiffs who are re
qmred by the abstention doctnne to litigate at least part of theIr
lawsuit m state court. There IS no pnncipled difference, for attor
ney fee purposes, between the plaIntiff who IS compelled to seek a
147. New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
New York State Human Rights Appeal
Bd., 59 App. Div 2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1977), leave to appeal denied, 43 N.Y.2d
648,403 N.Y.S.2d 1026,374 N.E.2d 630 (1978).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
149. Id. § 1988.
150. 470 F Supp. 1170 (D. Anz. 1979).
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state remedy because of a statutory reqUlrement, as m Carey and
the plamtiff who must do so because of a JudicIally-created rule, as
m abstention cases. Allowmg recovery for the cost of the state pro
ceeding, especIally if it disposes of the litigation, IS based on the
same conSIderations whICh moved Congress to permit fees under
the 1976 Act on a pendent state claIm actually litigated m the fed
eral court. The congressIOnal Judgment seeks to accommodate the
JudicIally-created rule requmng the resolution of cases on non
constitutional grounds whenever possible to aVOid deCIding consti
tutional questIons. 151 Applymg that determmatIon to the Judicially
created doctnne of abstention serves precIsely the same values
whICh Congress expressly recogmzed m the Fees Act.
The rule m Burchett refusmg to award fees because the fed
eral Judge cannot evaluate the serVIces rendered m the state tribu
nal, IS unsupportable. Apart from those cases where the Judge does
precIsely that for legal serVIces provIded before federal admimstra
tIve agencIes,152 the distnct Judge operates under a sImilar disabil
ity m evaluatmg fee claims for pre-tnal work, most of WhICh IS per
formed without the presence of the Judge. Yet it would hardly be
an appropnate rule to limit attorney fees to "in-court" legal aSSIS
tance. Here, as elsewhere, the Judge must rely on sworn testimony
scrutImzed with care by the opposmg counsel through the normal
operatIOn of the adversary system.
Finally m abstention cases, where the state court declSlon re
solves the dispute, the appropnate procedure for recovermg coun
sel fees would be for the plamtiff to ask the federal court, as the
plaintiff did m Carey to make the award. Of course, the plamtiff al
ways has the option under the abstention doctnne to submit the
entire case, mcluding the federal claims, to the state court for final
adjudicatIon. 153 Since the 1976 Act authonzes the state court to
award attorney fees,l54 a prevailing plamtiff would petition the
state Judge to make the award. If the state Judgment rests on a
state ground, then the state court would apply the two-pronged
test of substantiality and common nucleus adopted by the Con
gress for such purposes. 155
151.
152.
561 F.2d
153.
154.
155.

See text accompanymg notes 114-38 supra.
E.g., Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1978); Parker v. Califano.
320 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
England
Medical Exammers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
See text accompanymg notes 187-89 mfra.
See text accompanymg notes 190-208 mfra.
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Cases Misapplymg the Rule

A thIrd line of declSlons m multI-claim cases mvolvmg constI
tutIonal Issues embraces those where the courts unnecessarily ap
plied the two-pronged test to determme fee awards. The first case
was Southeast Legal Defense Group v Adams 156 where the plam
tiff sued to enJom state and federal officIals from locatmg a hIgh
way Mt. Hood Freeway through Portland, Oregon. They asserted
twelve claIms based on SIX federal statutes, mcluding sectIon 1983,
and the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The court prelimmarily
enJomed the defendants from building the hIghway because they
had failed to comply with the Federal AId Highway Act whICh re
qmred a heanng before determmmg hIghway locatIon. Although
the defendants abandoned the proJect, they appealed the distnct
court Judgment. The court of appeals dismIssed the appeal as
moot. 157 The distnct court then dismIssed the remamder of the
plamtiffs claIms as moot, and demed theIr request for counsel fees.
The plamtiffs noted theIr appeal from the demal of fees, and,
dunng its pendency Congress enacted the 1976 Fees Act. The
court of appeals then remanded the case for reconsIderatIon of the
counsel fee request m light of the new Act. 158 On remand, the dis
tnct court applied the two-pronged test m footnote 7 of the House
Report to reach the proper result. 159 Finding the reqUIsite sub
stantIality and common nucleus of operatIve fact, the distnct
Judge awarded counsel fees to the plamtiffs. It was, however, un
necessary to mvoke those standards because the federal statutory
claim, upon whICh the court entered a prelimmary mJunctIon, IS
embraced by sectIon 1983, a statute covered by the Fees Awards
Act.160 It must be recalled that, under the Act, the two-pronged
156. 436 F Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977).
157. Unreported order of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dated September 13,
1976. 436 F Supp. at 894.
158. Id.
159. The court rejected the fee claim agamst the federal defendants because
the Fees Act does not specifically provide for recovery agamst the United States as
reqUired. Id. at 893 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)).
160. The distnct court' analysIs IS somewhat confusmg because, havmg ap
plied the two-pronged test m order to assert Junsdiction over the pendent statutory
claims, it then noted that it was not necessary to deCide whether § 1983 extends to
vIOlations of federal statutes. Id. at 894 n.6. That reasomng IS flawed because the
plamtiff' nght of action, as distingUished from the Junsdiction of the federal court to
hear it, must denve from some source. It must come either from the statute itself as
an express or Implied claim for relief or from § 1983. See note 113 supra. If the dis
met court did Imply nght of action under the Federal Aid Highway Act, then that
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test IS to be applied only when the non-constitutIOnal claim IS not
covered by the statute.
Similarly the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir
cuit unnecessarily applied the two-pronged analysIs ill Lund v. Af
fleck,161 whICh mvolved three cases consolidated for purposes of
determmmg whether counsel fees should be awarded. In one suit,
unwed mothers challenged a state welfare regulation whICh dented
benefits if a man lived m the house, whether or not he furntshed
any monetary support for the family In the second case, a mmor
pregnant female challenged a state welfare regulatIOn whICh pro
VIded hIgher benefits for adult pregnant women. The plamtiff m
the thIrd case sued to enforce an earlier consent decree whICh pro
VIded for the proper care and treatment of mcarcerated Juveniles.
In all three cases, the plamtiffs mstituted the litigatIOn under sec
tIon 1983, allegmg constitutional and statutory VIOlations, and all
were concluded on non-constitutional grounds.
The distnct court applied the two-pronged test to determme
whether fees should be awarded, notmg that it had already applied
that test m at least one of the consolidated cases to determme JU
nsdictIon at an earlier stage of the litIgatIon. As m the Adams case,
however, it was unnecessary to apply the two-pronged standard for
attorney fee purposes because the non-constitutIonal claIms, upon
whIch the Judgments on the merits rested, were withm the scope
of section 1983. 162 The distnct court did not fully apprecIate that
the Gibbs-Hagans critena adopted by Congress IS to be applied
only when the non-constitutional claIm IS not covered by the Fees
Act. 163 In a short, uncritical opmlOn, the court of appeals affirmed
the Judgment and approved the analYSIS of the distnct Judge.
The distnct court m Affleck applied the two-pronged test ap
parently because it read footnote 7 m the House Report as castmg
"some doubt" on the VieW that section 1983 provIdes a remedy for
federal statutory claIms. 164 If the footnote IS read m IsolatIon from
c1a1m would be
non-fee cla1m, making appropnate the application of the two
pronged test. But the oplnlOn 1S not clear. Perhaps the court' failure to separate JU
nsdictional 1ssues from nghts of action lead it to m1sapply the two-pronged standard
for awarding attorney fees. For slmilar error In analys1s, see White
Beal, 447 F
Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
161. 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978).
162. In fauness to the distnct court, it appears that the First Circuit Court of
Appeals has never expressly held that § 1983 mcludes all or most federal statutory
c1a1ms, although it has made that assumption on numerous occaSlOns. E.g., Randall
Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974).
163. 415 U.S. at 528; 383 U.S. at 715.
164. 442 F Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.R.1. 1977).
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the rest of the legIslative hIstory and if the citation to Gibbs IS Ig
nored, it IS possible to reach that conclusIOn. As noted above, how
ever, the legIslative hIStOry IS crystal clear that Congress was fully
aware that "Section 1983 authonzes suits agamst State and local
officIals based upon Federal statutory as well as constitutional
nghts."165 Had the distnct Judge and the court of appeals m
Affleck exammed the legIslative hIstory of the Act more carefully
they mIght well have concluded that Congress mtended the courts
to gIVe an expanSIve reading of [section] 1983 and the Fees
Act."166
Although the courts m Adams and Affleck Improperly applied
the two-pronged test to non-constitutIonal clatms under section
1983 for attorney fee purposes, there are some mstances when
such post-Judgment evaluation IS arguably appropnate. The most
obVIOUS CIrcumstance IS when the distnct Judge (or on occaSIOn, an
appellate court) has not, either expressly or Impliedly applied the
Gibbs-Hagans pendent JunsdictIon doctnne because the case con
cluded at an early stage of the litIgation. The legIslative hIstory of
the 1976 Act IS clear that attorney fees may be awarded if a case
brought under a covered statute termmates m the plamtiffs favor
pnor to the entry of an order after a full eVIdentiary heanng. 167
Cases settled by consent decree, for example, are eligible for coun
sel fees. 16S When multI-claIm litigatIon under section 1983 mvolv
mg constitutional and non-constitutIOnal clatms termmates by con
sent Judgment, the court, upon plamtiff's motIon for counsel fees,
must determme whether JunsdictIon eXIsts over the actIOn pnor
to the award of fees. In such mstances, the court IS applymg the
two-pronged test for Junsdichonal purposes as a prereqmsite to
awarding attorney fees to the platntiff. Thus, it may frurly be saId
that, under these speCIal CIrcumstances, the court should apply the

165. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976); see Id. at 33312-14.
166. 442 F Supp. at 1114. The courts have held that the Fees Act should be
liberally construed. 562 F.2d at 393; Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc.
G & U, Inc.,
578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978). "The Act itself could not be broader. 437 U.S. at
694.
167 H.R. REP supra note 5, at 7; S. REP supra note 105, at 5, repnnted In
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-13.
168. Even if the plamtiff does not obtam formal decree and even if formal
Judgment of dismissal IS entered for the defendant, the plaintiff may nonetheless be
entitled to fees if the lawsuit acted as
catalyst" for changing the defendant' prac
Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979). Cj Tobeluk
Lind, 589 P
tices. E.g., Ross
2d 873 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1979) (plaintiffs could not recover their fees because, the
court found, their suit was not the catalyst for the defendant' remedial action).
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test at the time of awarding fees even though the non-constitutional
clrums are clearly withm the scope of sectIOn 1983.
Gagne v. Maher 169 fully illustrates the pomt. In that case, a
class of welfare recIpIents challenged the method of calculatmg aId
to families with dependent children whICh was employed by the
defendant officials. The plamtiffs attacked the methodology on con
stitutIOnal (equal protectIOn and due process) and statutory (SocIal
Security Act) grounds. Before tnal, the parties entered mto a con
sent decree. Upon applicatIon for fees, the distnct Judge applied
the two-pronged analYSIS m disposmg of the counsel fee Issue. The
court of appeals affirmed the fees award, approvmg the distnct
court's applicatIOn of the Gibbs-Hagans standards for pendent Juns
dictIon. Although the court erroneously described the statutory
nght of actIon as a non-fee clrum, it did appropnately mqmre
mto the JunsdictIonal prereqmsite for the lawsuit, thus provIding a
baSIS upon whIch to award fees m settled cases. 170
4.

ExhaustIon of Remedies

Although the Supreme Court has not reqmred plamtiffs who
assert constitutIonal claIms through sectIon 1983 to exhaust theIr
state admIlllstratIve I71 or JudicIal 172 remedies before mvokmg the
169. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44
(1979); see White v. Beal, 447 F Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
170. In White, the plaintiffs sued state welfare officials for refusmg to reim
burse the cost of eyeglasses. They alleged VIOlations of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and of the Social Security Act,
basmg theIr claims on § 1983. In an earlier Judgment, the distnct court enJomed the
defendants from continumg to deny payments as VIOlation of the Social Security
Act. White V Beal, 413 F Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir.
1977). Upon plamtiffs motion for theIr counsel fees, the tnal Judge referred to the
statutory VIOlation as
non-fee claim even though it was brought mto the suit
through § 1983, statute covered by the Fees Act. Unlike Gagne, however, it was
unnecessary m White to apply the two-pronged test for fee purposes because the
plamtiff prevailed on claim covered by the statute after full adjudication. But see
Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 273 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977) (1976 Fees
Act not applicable if consent decree based only on
federal statutory claim for
whICh court Implied
nght of action) (dictum). Cf Barrett
Kalinowski, 458 F
Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (prelimmary consent decree based In part on state law
over whICh the Judge ultimately declined JUrisdiction; In detenmmng whether the
plamtiff IS
prevailing party under the 1976 Act, the court cannot conSider the
pendent state claims) (dictum).
171. McNeese
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
172. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Although plamtiff asserting con
stitutional claim through § 1983 against state offiCials need not exhaust state JudiCial
remedies, the federal distnct court may be reqUired to apply the abstention doctnne.
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JunsdictIon of the federal court, it has not yet addressed that ques
tIon with regard to federal statutory claIms asserted through sectIon
1983. Indeed, as noted earlier the Court IS yet to hold that sectIon
1983 provIdes a remedy for all statutorily created claIms.173 In a
recent distnct court OpInIOn, the Judge did reqUIre the plaIntiff to
exhaust state admInIstratIve remedies In that context. In Harns v.
Campbell,174 an emotIonally disturbed child, through hIs mother,
brought suit agaInst state and local officIals for failing to provIde
hIm with an equal educatIonal opportunity The plaIntiff alleged VI
olatIons of the federal EducatIon for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975,175 the RehabilitatIon Act of 1973,176 the equal protectIon
clause of the fourteenth amendment, sectIon 1983, and varIOUS pro
VISIOns of state law The distnct court held that the plaIntiff must
first exhaust hIs state admInIstratIve remedies under the Handi
capped Children Act before bnngIng suit In federal court. The
Judge further held that the other federal claIms are premature and
that the dismIssal of the federal claIms precluded the exerCIse of
pendent JunsdictIOn over the state claIms. The Issue of attorney
fees under the 1976 Act was not discussed.
As m the abstentIon area, no case has been located whICh dis
cusses the applicatIon of the 1976 Fees Act to cases where exhaus
tIon of state remedies IS reqUIred. Similarly as In the abstentIon
area, closely analogous authority under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 IS available. ExamInatIon of the leading case, Carey v.
CJ
New York Gaslight Club Inc. 177 will not be repeated here as it
was adequately discussed In the preceding sectIon. Suffice it to say
here that fees under the 1976 Act should be available when the
federal plaIntiff IS reqUIred to exhaust her state or local admInIstra
tIve remedies as a prereqUIsite to brIngmg an actIOn In federal
court. The reasons whICh support that conclUSIOn under title VII,
as Interpreted In Carey and whIch were discussed In connectIon
with abstentIon, are equally applicable here. The legIslatIve hIStOry
Hamson v. NAACP 360 U.S. 167 (1959); see notes 139-55 supra. The Court has not
addressed the exhaustion Issue In the context of the other statutes covered by the
1976 Fees Act, except to note In dictum that exhaustion of federal administrative
remedies IS not reqUired In suits brought under Title IX of the Education Amend
ments of 1972. Cannon
Umversity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-07 n.41 (1979).
173. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
174. 472 F Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1979).
175. Id. at 52.
176. Id.at55.
177 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

234

[Vol. 2:193

states,178 and the courts have affirmed,179 the VIew that the 1976
Act should be construed as title VII has been mterpreted. Indeed,
the key language of the 1976 Act IS IdentIcal to the relevant words
of title VII. In such cases, the courts should follow the Carey case
m claIms ansmg under the 1976 Act where the plamtiff IS reqUIred
to exhaust her admInIstratIve remedies. Consequently if a plamtiff,
m that CIrcumstance, prevails before the state or local admmistra
tIve agency or failing there, prevails upon returnmg to the federal
court, attorney fees should be awarded for the expenses mcurred
before the state or local agency
VI.
A.

MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION IN STATE COURT

Background

It IS mstructIve to revIew a selectIon of the state court cases
apart from the federal court cases for several reasons. It under
scores that the assertIon of federal nghts m state court IS still, as it
was m the begmnmg, a very vIable alternatIve to the federal fo
rum. Recent scholarly literature has reflected the mcreasmg use
of the state courts to litigate federal nghts, both constitutIOnal and
statutory 180 So-called public mterest" litigants espeCIally have be
gun to rethmk theIr refleXIve VIew that the vmdicatIon of federal
nghts IS best suited to a federal forum. 181 The recent senes of
door-closmg" declSlons by the Supreme Court has accelerated the
trend away from the federal courts toward the state courtS. 182 His
178. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 6-8; S. REP supra note 105, at 4-6, repnnted
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911-13.
179. See, e.g., Brown
Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1978); King v.
Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1979); Kurtz
City
180. E.g., Stafford
of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1979); see generally Redish
& Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action III State Court, 75 MICH. L.
REv 311 (1976); Note, Of Laboratones and Liberties: State Court Protection of Po
litical and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV 533 (1976). ThiS shift away from the federal
courts toward the state courts should please those writers who have severely criti
Cized the scope of Gibbs. See, e.g., Shakman, supra note 71, Note, The Concept of
Law-Tied Pendent JUrisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger ReconSIdered, 87 YALE L.J.
627 (1978).
181. See generally Brown, Public Interest Litigation In the States-A Foster
Home for Federal Orphans? 12 SUFFOLK L. REV 1184 (1978); Comment, Protecting
Fundamental Rights III State Courts: Fitting
State Peg to
Federal Hole, 12
HARV C.R.-C.L.L. REV 63 (1977).
182. E.g., Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing); Younger
Hams,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (equitable restramt); Snyder
Hams, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Juns
dictional amount). See generally notes 180 & 181 supra.
III
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toncally the state courts were perceIved m fact and m theory as
the pnmary protectors of federal nghts,183 partly because of theIr
mdependent source of power and partly because the federal courts
had, m our early hIstOry very limited JunsdictIon over federal ques
tIOns. Also, the applicatIon of the Fees Act m state courts add a
few extra wnnkles whIch Justifies separate treatment.
It should be noted mitIally that state courts have concurrent
JunsdictIOn with federal courts over federal claIms. 184 The plamtiff
who believes her federal statutory or constitutIonal nghts have
been VIOlated may mstitute an actIon either m state or federal
court, unless Congress otherwIse proVIdes by gIVmg either tnal
court exclUSIve JunsdictIon. 18s Apart from the optIon of the plamtiff
to utilize the state forum, the Supreme Court has held that the
state courts are obligated under the Supremacy Clause to entertam
federal claIms, at least when the state courts entertaIn snnilar suits
under state law 186
The essentIal difference between multI-clatm litIgatIon m the
183. "In the scheme of the Constitution, [the state courts] are the pnmary guar
antors of constitutional nghts, and m many cases they may be the ultimate ones.
Hart, The Power of Congress to Ltmit the JUrisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exer
cise In Dialectic, 66 HARV L. REv 1362, 1401 (1953).
184. "Concurrent Junsdiction has been common phenomenon m our Judiclal
hlstory, and excluslve federal court Junsdiction over cases ansmg under federal law
has been the exception rather than the rule. Charles Dowd Box Co. v Courtney
368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (footnote omitted); accord Chaflin
Houseman, 93 U.S.
Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453
130 (1876); Williams
(1976); Board of Trustees
Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1978). See generally
THE FEDERALIST, No. 82.
185. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976) (bankruptcy Junsdiction excluslve m
federal courts) with Id. § 1331(a) (1976) (federal question Junsdiction for cases
mvolvmg less than $10,000 excluslve m state courts). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 53 at 418-38.
186. Testa
Katt, 330 U.S. at 386. In an earlier case, the Court pennitted
New York court to decline the exerClse of Junsdiction over clalm under the Federal
Employers Llability Act for an otherwlse valid excuse. Douglas
New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929). In Douglas, state statute allowed non
resldents to sue forelgn compames only m certam cases, among whICh Douglas com
plamt did not number. Relymg on Douglas,
Flonda appellate court recently af
finned the dismlssal of clalm based on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(forblds discnmmation agamst handicapped persons m federally asslsted programs),
m part, because it believed the Flonda courts lacked sufficlent power to provlde the
plamtiff with an adequate remedy It held that no Flonda court can undertake re
sponsibility for federal statute without concern for its own power to effectuate
Judgment.
Zonck
Tynes, 372 So.2d 133, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Al
though the plamtiff m ZOrlck prevailed on state law ground, he was unable to ob
tam attorney fees because of the dismlssal of the § 504 clalm, whICh could have pro
vlded basls for counsel fees through § 1983.
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state courts and m the federal courts IS that the state courts do not
need to rely on concepts such as pendent junsdictIon m order to
adjudicate all the claIms m the case. Since every state has tnal
courts of general junsdictIon, unlike the federal courts whICh have
limited junsdictIon, the plamtiff may plead every available claIm m
the state court without fear of dismIssal because the court lacks JU
nsdictIon, or because the state law clrums are more appropnately
litIgated m the state forum. Of course, state Jomder rules are fully
applicable and the multI-claIm plamtiff must comply with them.
But other than those rather narrow limitatIons, the state court
plamtiff has, it may fairly be saId, almost no difficulty assertmg all
available claIms agamst the defendant.
Because state courts have concurrent JunsdictIon over federal
claims, it follows that they also have the power to apply all federal
remedial statutes whIch may asSISt the state court m grantmg full
relief. 187 It appears that all state courts award costs to the prevail
mg party at the conclusIOn of the law suit, and under the 1976
Fees Act, attorney fees are deemed to be a part of the costs. "188
Also, Congress mtended the state courts to apply the Fees Act m
cases properly brought before them. RepresentatIve Drman, the
floor manager m the House, stated: "ThIS bill would authonze
State and Federal Courts to award counsel fees m actIons brought
under specified sectIons of the United States Code relatmg to CIvil
and constitutIonal nghts. "189
B.

The New York Cases

Most of the reported cases applymg the 1976 Fees Act m state
court have arIsen m New York. There are only a relatIvely few
cases m other JUrIsdictIons. 19o Thus, for illustratIve purposes, we
187. E.g., Sullivan
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). T the ex
tent that state court must, under Testa or other constitutional or statutory compul
SiOn, entertam federal claim, the state court must proVide all remedies authOrized
by Congress, mcluding attorney fees. 330 U.S. at 386; see generally Note, The
Enforceability and Proper Implementation of § 1983 and the Attorney Fees
Awards Act m State Courts, 20 ARIZ. L. REV 743 (1978).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Thus, at minimUm, if state court allows costs
to prevailing party for claim based on state law then it must, under Testa, award
counsel fees as part of the costs to party who prevails on claims to whICh the 1976
Fees Act extends. 330 U.S. at 386.
189. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976).
190. E.g., Fairbanks Correctional Center Inmates
Williamson, 600 P.2d 743
Durango School Dist. No. 9-R, 591 P.2d 1329 (Colo. Ct.
(Alaska 1979); Thorpe
App. 1978), cert. granted, No. 78-068 (Colo. Sup. Ct. March 19, 1979); Board of Trus
tees V. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1978).
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will focus on the New York decIsIOns. In Young v TOta,191 the
plamtiff sought a declaratIOn of unconstitutIonality and an mJunc
tIon agamst the enforcement of a provIsIon m the state SOCIal ser
VIces act known as the work rule. That prOVISIOn reqUIred reCIpI
ents of public assIstance to work a prescribed number of days per
week. The Impact of the law was to cause recIpIents to work for
pay far below the mmimum wage. The plamtiff challenged the
work rule on the basIs of state and federal law mcluding consti
tutIonal grounds. The tnal court mvalidated the prOVlSlon based on
two prOVISIOns of the state constitutIon. It demed attorney fees un
der the 1976 Act on the ground that the Act does not apply to state
courts. 192
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate DivlSlon, Fourth
Department, reversed the demal of counsel fees and remanded for
an evaluation of the amount due. First, it held, referrmg to Repre
sentatIve Drman s floor statement, that the Fees Act does apply to
state court proceedings. Then, it rejected the contentIOn that the
Act should be declared mapplicable because the tnal Judge decIded
the case on state law grounds. The court noted that sectIon 1983,
m the context of thIs case, grants substantially the same nghts as
the state constitutional proVIsIOns relied on by the tnal court. 193
Without further diSCUSSIOn, the court reversed the lower court Judg
ment and remanded the case for a determmatIOn of the amount of
counsel fees.
While the court m Young reached the correct result, its rea
sonmg Ignored the proper mterpretatIon of the statute announced
m the Seals case. Seals, followmg the footnote m the House Re
port, held that courts must apply the pendent JunsdictIon test m
order to award counsel fees when the deCISIOn rests on a clatm not
covered by the Act and one of the claIms m the case IS a federal
constitutIonal question asserted pursuant to sectIon 1983. By citmg
Seals, the appellate divlSlon apparently recogmzed the appropnate
test for the application of the Fees Act. For some unexplamed rea
son, however, it then failed to apply the test to the facts and clatms
m the case before it so as to produce a sound result. 194
191. 66 App. Div 2d 377, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1979).
192. ld. at 378,413 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
193. ld. at 380, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
194. On the same day as Young was deCIded, the appellate diVISIOn also an
nounced its deCISIon m Ashley
Curtis, 67 App. Div 2d 828, 413 N.Y.S.2d 528
(1979), where plamtiff, pursuant to Article 78 and § 1983, successfully prevented ter
mmation of her welfare benefits by state and local offiCIals. The appellate diVISIOn
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In sharp contrast, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
DIvlSlon, Second Department, accurately stated the appropnate
test for awarding fees but reached the wrong result m Bess v.
TOW. 195 In that case, Mrs. Bess son was shot and killed. Because
she did not have adequate additional funds to pay for the funeral
expenses, she used her monthly rent and food allowance provIded
under state law to pay the undertaker When she applied to the so
CIal servIces agency for an emergency grant of rent and food money
for herself and her survlVmg children, the agency demed Mrs.
Bess request. It then granted her a $275 rent advance upon her
sIgnmg a recoupment agreement provIding for repayment of that
advance m equal mstallments over the next SIX months, to be de
ducted from her regular monthly subsIstence grants. 196
Pursuant to article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules (CPLR), the plamtiff challenged the demal of bunal aSSIS
tance and the recoupment provlSlon as vIOlatmg state and federal
law mcluding the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend
ment. 197 The court found that the defendant local department of
SOCIal serVIces mamtamed a policy of denymg any bunal aSSIstance
where the cost of the funeral exceeded $650. If the cost was less
than that amount, the department would reImburse the reCIpIent
for the full cost of the funeral. The tnal Judge held that thIS policy
VIOlated a prOVlSlon of the state SOCIal ServIces Law and demes
equal treatment to welfare reCIpIents who cannot bury theIr dead
"198 He added: "The distinction made and the divlSlon created
among welfare reCIpIents of equal need IS a most mSIdious type of
mVIdious discnmmation. "199 Because the court ordered the local
defendants to pay the plamtiff $650, it did not address the attack
on the validity of the recoupment prOVlSlon. It also demed the
plamtiff's request for attorney fees without any diSCUSSIOn.
On appeal, the appellate divlSlon held that the 1976 Fees Act
reversed the demal of fees as to the § 1983 relief obtamed agamst the local offiCials,
but affinned it as to the state offiCials because the relief rested on state law By
Ignonng the congressIOnally-established rule of deCISIOn regarding such claims, the
appellate court failed to apply the appropnate analYSIS, and thus reached the wrong
result. For an even more mscrutable deCISIOn denymg fees m Similar SOCial secu
rity benefits case, see Gayton v. Shang, 97 Misc. 2d 780, 400 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
195. 66 App. Div 2d 844, 411 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1978).
196. 93 Misc. 2d 140, 141,402 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
197. [d.
198. 93 Misc. 2d at 142,402 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
199. [d. at 144,402 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
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IS fully applicable m state courts, even absent any express state au
thorIzatIon. It then held that the case does not mvolve any "bona
fide sectIon 1983 claIm because it IS sImply an artIcle 78 proceed
mg of the CPLR. 200 With regard to the trIal court's discussIOn of
the equal protectIon claIm, the appellate court held that it was
wholly unnecessary to the result and IS of dubIOUS constitutional
validity "201 Recogmzmg the availability of the pendent JUrIsdictIon
test for fees as announced m Seals and Kimbrough, the court stated
that the facts alleged by Mrs. Bess do not raIse a substantial" con
stitutIonal clalm. 202 Alternatively the court held that fees under
the 1976 Act may be awarded m the discretion of the trIal Judge
and the plamtiff did not show any abuse of that discretIon. 203
The appellate divlSlon, while recogmzmg the applicable legal
prInCIples under the 1976 Act for awarding fees when the case IS
disposed of on a non-fee claIm, nonetheless mIsapplied the settled
test. By reqmrmg the plamtiff to show that its constitutIOnal claIm
under sectIon 1983 was substantIal," the court Ignored the holding
of the United States Supreme Court m Hagans 204 the case to
whICh the legIslatIve hIstory of the Fees Act expressly refers. 205 In
Hagans, while acknowledgmg that federal JUrIsdictIon attaches only
to substantial" federal questions, the Court adopted a much more
mmlmal test of substantIality than mIght have appeared from
some of its older declSlons. 206 The federal court IS without JUrIsdic
obVIOusly fnvo
tion only if the claIm IS "wholly msubstantIal,
lous," or "absolutely deVOId of merit. "207 The court makes that de
termmatIon by lookmg solely to the plamtiff's complamt, not to any
later developments m the case. 208 ThIS mmimal test of federal
200. 66 App. Div 2d at 844-45,411 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. ThiS alternative ground appears Inconsistent with the congresslOnally
approved standard that prevailing plaIntiff should ordinarily recover an attorney
fee unless speCial Circumstances would render such an award unjust. Newman
Piggle Park Enterpnses, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); S. REP supra note 105, at
4, repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911. 12; H.R. REP
supra note 5, at 6.
204. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
205. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 4 n.7.
206. See note 77 supra.
207. 415 U.S. at 536-37 (citations omitted) (quoting from earlier Supreme Court
cases). In dissent, Justice RehnqUist protested that the new formulation allowed JU
risdiction so long as the plaIntiff "is able to plead hiS claim with straight face. ld.
at 564.
208. See note 76 supra.
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court JUrIsdictIon IS the one adopted by the Congress to resolve the
attorney fee Issue m multi-claim litIgatIon mvolvmg constitutional
Issues when the deCISIon rests on a non-fee claim. The appellate di
VISIOn misapplied that rule m the Bess case.
Although the reported state deCISIons constitute a relative
handful when compared to the federal cases, we should expect
that, as public mterest litIgants mcreasmgly use the state forums,
more cases will be deCided there under the Fees Act. In such m
stances, the plamtiffs must be careful to present their fee claims m
precise and careful terms so that the state Judges are absolutely
certam about their authority to award fees and the proper test to
be applied. Nothmg can replace careful analYSIS, however and the
deCISIons m New York illustrate the ease with whICh courts can
commit error m applymg a statute with comprehenSive and ex
plicit legislative history "209
VII.

POTENTIAL SCOPE OF THE RULE

It IS clear that, based on the legislatIve history of the 1976
Fees Act, the reach of the statute IS potentIally very broad. The
most expansive use of the Act IS arguably m multI-clrum litigation
mvolvmg non-federal governmental offiCials or others acting under
color of state law CreatIve pleading by plamtiffs could very well
sweep withm the scope of the Act cases whICh might not, at first
blush, be covered by the statute.

A.

Non-Constitutwnal Federal Statutory Clatn/,s

One of the most obvIOUS avenues for an expansive application
of the Fees Act IS through the use of sectIon 1983. Unless the Su
preme Court overrules or modifies the unammous view of the
courts of appeals, plamtiffs may brmg all federal statutory claims
agamst persons actmg under color of law through the remedial de
vice of section 1983. Although thiS artIcle does not address smgle
claim litIgatIon, it IS clear that statutory claims alone may be mstI
tuted under section 1983. If there should be a JUrIsdictIOnal prob
lem m the federal courts,210 then the plamtiff may litIgate m the
209. See note 126 supra at 269.
210. E.g., Chapman
Houston Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 441 U.S. 600
(1979). Even if § 1983 IS construed to cover all federal statutory clrums, the question
of JUrIsdiction still remams. The Chapman case cuts off the use of § 1343 to secure
JUrIsdiction over § 1983 statutory-based claIms unless the underlymg statute IS one
prOVIding for equal rIghts or for the protection of CIvil rIghts. 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3), (4) (1976). After Chapman, many statutory claIms will not fit the Court' re
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state courts.
There IS a wIde range of cIvil rIghts prOVISIons m federal stat
utes whICh could provIde a baSIS for many suits agamst non-federal
governmental offiCIals. The United States Code contams apprOXI
mately eIghty anbdiscrImmabon provlSlons, whIch cover a WIde
range of actIvitIes. 211 While they vary m the groups to whom pro
tectIon IS gIven, most are directed at reCIpients of federal funds.
Such statutory prOVlSlons could prOVIde the baSIS for suits agamst
public offiCIals and entibes through section 1983 to achIeve compli
ance with the statutory proscrIptIons. 212 In additIOn many federal
statutes whICh prOVIde funds for a WIde varIety of purposes create
rIghts for benefiCIarIes who do not fall withm traditIonally pro
tected categorIes such as race, color, religlOn, sex, or national OrI
gm. 213 If these clrums are enforced through the remedial deVIce of
sectIon 1983, attorney fees would be available under the 1976 Act.
When the whole range of federal statutory rIghts IS exammed for
the prIvate claIms that may be available through sectIon 1983, the
litIgatIon potentIal and the concomitant coverage of the Fees Act
are enormous.
B.

Non-Constitutwnal State Clatms

The second major area of potentIally expanSIve use of the Fees
Act IS m multI-claIm litIgatIon when the state claIms are Jomed
with federal constitutIonal clrums, either m state or III federal
strIctive definition. Consequently alternative bases of JUrIsdiction will have to be
found if the plamtiff deslIes to litigate her clalms m
federal court. Without ex
tended discusslOn, there are at least two JUrIsdictional possibilities: (1) pendent JUrIS
diction under § 1343 (assummg the plamtiff IS already asserting
constitutional
claIm through § 1983); and (2) general federal question Junsdiction under § 1331(a)
(whICh reqUIres $10,000 mlmmum amount m controversy' m 1978, the House of
Representatives passed bill whICh would have elimmated the $10,000 reqUIrement
and abolished diversity of citizenshIp Junsdiction. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), 124 CONGo REC. Hl,553-61, Hl,569-70 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978)).
211. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A COMPILATION OF
FEDERAL LAws AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS FOR NONDISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS (1978) (staff study).
212. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. DaVIS, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979)
(section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, whICh prOVIdes certam protections for
handicapped persons m federally aSSIsted programs). See generally LIpson, supra
note 126.
213. See, e.g., Coalition for Block Grant Compliance
HUD, 450 F Supp. 43
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (action agamst federal and local offiCIals under the Housmg and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-375, 90 Stat. 633, to enJom
dispensmg federal funds to community whICh fails to Identify the housmg assIs
tance needs of persons expected to reSIde withm that community).

242

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:193

court. Recent distnct court litigatIon under sectIon 1983 mvolvmg
police mIsconduct illustrates the potentIal. In Murray v. Mur
phy 214 the plamtiff brought suit m federal court agamst the City of
PhiladelphIa, two of its police officers, and theIr supervIsors for
mIsconduct allegedly vIOlatmg the federal constitutIon, federal cIvil
nghts statutes, and state tort law In denymg the defendants mo
tIon to dismISS, the court permitted the plamtiff to mamtam hIs ac
tIon on all the claims, both constitutIonal and non-constitutIonal.
Even if the plamtiff ultimately prevails only on the state tort law
claim, he will be entitled to attorney fees under the 1976 Act. In
JunsdictIons where the standards for recovery agamst offiCIal mIS
conduct under state tort law are less restnctIve than under section
1983, plamtiffs would be well adVIsed to follow the approach of the
Murray case and other recent suits pursumg that course. 215
Although not without mIxed blessmgs, litIgatmg these multt
claIm suits m state court may provIde additIOnal benefits. Take, for
example, the mcreasmg number of cases m state courts whIch chal
lenge two areas of traditIOnal state concern: (a) The validity of
financmg public school education through the property tax system;
and (b) exclUSIOnary land use regulation by local mumcipalitIes. In
Robmson v. Cahill,216 the plamtiffs challenged the validity of
the New Jersey property tax system whICh supported its public
schools. They asserted claims based on the equal protection clauses
of the state and federal constitutions as well as prOVlSlons m the
state constitutIOn relatmg to public education and real property tax
assessment. In the tnal court, the plamtiffs prevailed on both then
federal and state constitutional claIms. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, however, m affirmmg the lower court Judgment, relied
solely on the state constitutIOn. 217 Similarly m Southern Bur
lington County NAACP v. TownshIp of Mount Laurel,218 the plam
tiffs sued to enJom the defendant's zomng ordinance as repugnant
to the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions
and the New Jersey zonmg enabling statute. Agam the tnal court
utilized both state and federal constitutional provlSlons to mvalidate
the ordinance, but the New Jersey Supreme Court placed its af
firmance on state law alone. 219
214. 441 F Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
215. E.g., M.C.I. Concord AdVISory Bd.
Hall, 457 F Supp. 911 (D. Mass.
1978); Santiago
City of Philadelphia, 435 F Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
216. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
217. Id. at 490-501, 303 A.2d at 282-87.
218. See note 55 supra.
219. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.
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In both cases, the deCISion of the state supreme court placed
the Judgments beyond the reVIewmg power of the United States
Supreme Court, an advantage some public mterest litigants con
sider critical. 220 At the same time, because of the presence of the
fourteenth amendment allegations asserted through section 1983,
the plamtiffs retam the benefit of the 1976 Fees Act, so long as the
federal constitutional claim meets the test of substantiality and
both state and federal claims anse out of a "common nucleus of op
erative fact. "221
In neither case could the defendant ask the state tnal Judge to
exercise discretIOn to dismISS the state claims because they sub
stantially predommate, a power whICh federal Judges may exercise
under Gibbs when such cases are filed 10 federal court: "Once it
appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to
which the federal claim IS only an appendage, the state claim may
frurly be dismissed. "222 If the Robmson and Mount Laurel cases had
been filed 10 federal court, the distnct Judge mIght well have exer
Cised her discretion to dismiSS the state law claIms. 223 The broad
power exerCIsed by state courts of general JunsdictIon gIVes the
plamtiff a great advantage to Jom a Wide range of claims, both state
and federal, whICh even under the liberal rule of the Gibbs-Hagans
line might not survive a federal court actIOn litigated to Judg
ment. 224
220. If the state court Judgment rests on state ground, revIew m the Supreme
Court IS not available unless the defendant offiCIals are somehow challengmg the va
lidity of the state law on federal grounds (a very unlikely possibility). Even if the
state court Judgment rests on both state and federal law, revIew may still be pre
cluded because of the doctrme of "independent and adequate state ground, e.g.,
Fox Film Corp.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935), unless the state court did not mtend
to rest its declSlon mdependently on state law. Delaware
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
652 (1979). In contrast, if the same case were mstituted m federal tnal court with
the state claIms pendent to the federal claIms, the Supreme Court would, of course,
not be barred by the mdependent and adequate state ground doctnne from re
vlewmg the entire case. See text accompanymg notes 59-77 supra. E.g., 383 U.S. at
715. "Commg before the court m thIS way, we are not confined m our revIew of the
declSlon of the lower [federal] court withm the same limits that we would be if the
case were here on error from the Judgment of state court. Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 154 (1896). Indeed, if the federal claIm IS of constitu
tional dimenSIOns, the Supreme Court has admOnIshed the federal courts to deCIde
the state claIms first. E.g., Siler v. LOUIsville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
221. On occaSIOn, prior deCISIOn of the Supreme Court may undennme the at
tempt by the plamtiff to satisfy even the mInImal test of substantiality set forth m
Hagans. 415 U.S. at 528. For example, current litigation challengmg school finance
systems based on the property tax will have to confront the Impact of San AntOnIO
School Dist.
Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
222. 383 U.S. at 727.
223. See, e.g., Moor County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
224. ld. See also Schweiker
Gordon, 442 F Supp. 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
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Finally a few state court declSlons have created one disadvan
tage m wrongful death, CIvil rIghts type actIons brought agamst
non-federal governmental officIals. In two recent appellate deCI
SIOns m Califorma225 and Colorado,226 the courts held that con
stitutIonally-based claIms for relief under sectIon 1983 and under
state wrongful death statutes merge so as to extmgUIsh the sec
tIon 1983 claIm. In the Califorma case, thIs merger doctrme pre
cluded the plamtiff from seCUrIng equitable relief under sectIon
1983 because the state wrongful death statute provIded only a dam
age remedy 227 Interestmgly enough, the Califorma court saId that,
if the case had been filed m federal court, a different result would
have been reached. 228 In federal court, the appellate tribunal saId
that the plamtiff could seek both equitable and legal relief under
sectIOn 1983 and damages under the state wrongful death stat
ute. 229 ThIS holding would seem to run counter to the well-set
tled rule that "the law should produce uniform declSlons withm
each state regardless whether an actIOn IS brought m a state or a
federal court. "230 While that rule has been black letter law In di
versity cases SInce Ene Railroad v. Tompkms,231 the Suprem
acy Clause would make it equally applicable to federal questIon
suits. 232
VIII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976 IS a
broad directIon from the Congress to state and federal courts, al
lowmg prevailing plamtiffs, among others, to recover theIr counsel
fees m a WIde range of CIvil rIghts and CIvil libertIes litIgatIon. In
Jones v. McElroy 429 F Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In each of these cases, the fed
eral trial Judge dismissed some or all of the pendent state claims.
225. Alvarez
Wiley 71 Cal. App. 3d 599, 604-05, 139 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553-54
(1977).
226. Jones
Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 8, 550 P.2d 339, 344 (1976), cert. dis
missed, 432 U.S. 183 (1977).
227 Alvarez
Wiley, 71 Cal. App. 3d 599, 605, 139 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553 (1977).
228. Id., 139 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
229. Id.
230. Warner
Pernno, 585 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1978); see 330 U.S. at 393;
cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) ("rules of declSlon act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (compa
rable rules of declslOn act for certain Civil nghts cases); Robertson
Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978) (federal court must ordinarily apply state survival statute In
§ 1983 action).
231. Ene R.R. Co.
TompkinS, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
232. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Sullivan
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 238 (1969). See also note 230 supra.
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the context of multI-claIm litIgatIOn whICh mcludes claIms based on
one or more of the statutes covered by the Act, the Congress has
recogmzed that modern rules of pleading allow plamtiffs to Jom
other related claIms whICh are not covered by the Act. A dilemma
arIses because the court may enter Judgment for the plamtiff on a
non-fee claIm even though there may be merit to one of the claIms
covered by the statute. In such cases, if the plamtiff could not re
cover counsel fees, she mIght well forego Jommg all available
claIms, thus defeatmg a strong policy for "jomder of claIms, partIes,
and remedies. "233
In additIon, the dilemma has an extra dimensIOn when one of
the plamtiff's claIms rests on a federal constitutIonal ground. In
such cases, the JudicIally created rule directs the courts to dispose
of the case, whenever possible, on the non-constitutIOnal claIm,
whICh may be one not covered by the Fees Act. Recogmzmg these
problems whICh mhere m many multI-claIm suits, the Congress
prOVIded a rule of declSlon m the legIslatIve hIstory of the Act. It
essentIally diVIded the multI-claIm cases mto two categorIes: (1)
Where only non-constitutIonal claIms are alleged; and (2) where
both constitutIonal and non-constitutIonal claIms are asserted. For
the first category it directed the courts to deCIde the fee claIm for
counsel fee purposes even if the court were mclined to dispose of
the case on the non-fee ground. In the second category it directed
the courts to apply the two-pronged test for pendent JUrIsdictIon as
the baSIS for awarding fees when the plamtiff prevails on the non
fee claIm.
The policy reasons undergIrding the congreSSIOnally estab
lished rule of declSlon for the first category of cases do not appear
to raIse any partIcular difficultIes. A Judge s dispositIon to resolve
the plamtiff's lawsuit on the non-fee claIm should not foreclose the
plamtiff from recoverIng counsel fees. Requmng the court to de
CIde the claIm covered by the 1976 Fees Act to determme whether
attorney expenses should be awarded does not Impose substantIal
additIonal burdens on the court or the partIes. In a few cases, it
may mean deCIding a questIon of first ImpreSSIOn under the appli
cable federal statute, or reqUIrmg additIOnal brIefs and argument.
Those burdens would be present m any event were the plamtiff to
rest her case solely on the statutory ground covered by the Act.
The congreSSIOnal rule governmg the second category of cases
(multI-claIm litIgatIon mvolvmg constitutIonal questIons when the
233.

383 U.S. at 724 (footnote omitted).
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dispositIon rests on a non-constitutional ground to whICh the Fees
Act does not apply) does nllse Important policy Judgments. Why
should plamtiffs be able to recover theIr counsel fees when they
prevail on claIms not expressly covered by the 1976 Fees Act? It IS
mstructIve to examme those reasons bnefly First, the rule en
hances the "junsprudentlal policy of aVOIding unnecessary deCI
SIOns of constitutIonal questIons without penalizmg plamtiffs who
Jom non-constitutIonal claIms. 234 If fees could not be awarded to
plaIntiffs m such CIrcumstances, they mIght well forego theIr non
constitutIonal claIms so as to msure recovery of counsel fees. In
such mstances, the courts would be compelled to deCIde critIcal
and m some cases far-reachmg questIons of constitutIonal dimen
SIOn. That unsalutary result would nghtly subject the Congress to
critIcIsm for lackmg sensitIvity to a JudicIally created rule whICh IS
suffiCIently sound to merit full congreSSIonal support.
Second, the consIderatIons of convemence, JudiCIal economy
and faIrness, whICh moved the Court m Gibbs to mterpret liberally
the case limitation m artIcle III, are equally applicable here. Be
cause attorney fees are so hIgh, plamtiffs, and espeCIally theIr attor
neys, do not lightly engage m litIgatIon unless there IS some prom
Ise of recovermg counsel fees. If such fees are not available when a
multI-claIm case mvolvmg a fee-claIm IS deCIded on a non-fee
ground, the plamtiff mIght forego Jommg non-fee to fee claIms. If
the plamtiff prevails, that result mIght not be partIcularly detn
mental. But if they lose on the covered claIm, it mIght lead to the
filing of a second suit m state court, for example. That tram of
events would undermme the values of economy convemence, and
faIrness whIch benefit all partIes, as well as subject the plamtiff un
necessarily to defenses based on a statute of limitatIons,235 or on
res Judicata. 236 Those Issues are suffiCIently senous and complex to
234. Lund
Affieck, 442 F Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.R.1. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 75
(1st Cir. 1978); accord, 588 F.2d at 637 n.5 (dictum).
235. Cf Owen EqUip. & Erection Co.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 n.20 (1978)
(state rules of limitation govern plamtiff' subsequent state court suit after unsuc
cessful attempt to mvoke federal court junsdiction).
236. E.g., Woods Exploration & Producmg Co.
Alummum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (after judgment m
related federal suit, the doctnne of res judicata bars subsequent state court action
(1) whICh alleges state claim ansmg out of the same facts as the litigated federal
claim; or (2) if the plamtiff was afforded an opportunity to allege the state grounds
whICh constituted the same cause of action m the federal proceedings under
Gibbs); accord, International Ass n of Machmlsts & Aerospace Workers
Nix, 512
F.2d 125, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1975) (applymg the pnnclples of Woods Exploration to
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persuade policymakers to encourage plamtiH's to aVOId those poten
tIal pitfalls. That IS precIsely the Judgment whICh Congress has
made here.
defense based on collateral estoppel). Brady
TWA, Inc., 274 A.2d 146 (Del. Super.
Ct.), afI'd, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971) (state court action based on state claims, whICh
were or could have been litigated In earlier federal court action under pendent Juns
diction doctnne, are barred by res Judicata); accord, McCann
Whitney 25
N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see Hughes v. TWA, Inc., 336 A.2d 572, 575-77, (Del.
Sup. Ct.), cert. denied sub nom. Summa Corp.
TWA, Inc., 423 U.S. 841 (1975)
(after Judgment In related federal suit, the doctrme of res Judicata does not bar
subsequent state court action whICh alleges state claim ansmg out of the same facts
as the federal claim (1) where the earlier federal suit was dismissed on Junsdictional
grounds, not on the merits and (2) where the federal Judge would have dismissed
the pendent state claim under the discretionary power authonzed m Gibbs); cf·
Grubb
Public Utils. Comm n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930) (action between the same
parties m federal court barred by pnor state court Judgment regarding matters ac
tually presented to sustam or defeat the nght asserted, but also as respects any other
available matter whICh might have been presented to that end"); Note, The
PreclUSIVe Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L.
REV 610 (1978). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 61.1,
at 155, 160-61, 178-79 (Tent. Draft No.5, 1978). But see Atlantic C.L.R. Co.
Engmeers, 398 U.S. 281, 294-96 (1970) (a plaIntiff has the option of Jommg state
claim as pendent to federal claim m federal suit under Gibbs or of pursumg the
state claim m
separate action m state court). Although the holding of the Fifth
Circuit In the Woods Exploration case appears mconslstent with the opmlOn m
Atlantic C.L.R., the court of appeals never mentioned that aspect of Atlantic
C.L.R. The Fifth Circuit did examme the Atlantic C.L.R. declSlon for its teach
prevailing party In the completed federal suit
mgs on the question whether
may secure an mJunction agaInst the subsequent state court proceedings, notwith
standing the anti-mJunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The court of appeals
held that § 2283 authorizes federal court to enJom state court suit whICh IS pre
cluded under the doctrIne of res Judicata (the so-called relitigation principle).
438 F.2d at 1312. That holding also appears mconslstent with Atlantic C.L.R. It
should be noted that the question whether the res Judicata effect IS to be detenmned
by state or federal law IS another unresolved Issue In thiS complex area of the law
Compare Southwest AIrlines Co.
Texas Int'! AIrlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th CiL),
cert. dented, 434 U.S. 832 (1977) (federal law applies) with Hughes
TWA, Inc.,
336 A.2d 572 (Del. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied sub nom. Summa Corp.
TWA, Inc., 423
U.S. 841 (1975) (state law applies). Although the Supreme Court has apparently
never addressed that question when the earlier federal suit Involves "federal ques
tion JUrIsdiction, it has exammed the Issue m diversity cases. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 843-44. If the JUrISdiction of the federal court IS based
on the citizenship of the parties, the state court need only give that res Judicata ef
fect to the prior federal Judgment that it would give to comparable Judgment of its
own courts, even though the effect given IS considered "federal question for pur
poses of Supreme Court review Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130
(1874). But see Metcalf Watertown, 128 U.S. 585 (1888) (action by an assignee of
federal court Judgment to enforce that Judgment does not arIse under the Constitu
tion or laws of the United States to permit mvocation of federal trIal court Junsdic
tion). Of course, if the federal suit has not yet proceeded to Judgment, none of these
difficulties arIses because the parties are still free to conduct parallel litigation on
the same or Similar claims m state court. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
228 (1922).
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ThIrd, the Inability of the courts to award fees In these Clr
cumstances mIght well deter plamtiffs from USIng a federal forum
to vIndicate federal constitutIonal and statutory nghts. If the Impe
tus behInd the Gibbs rule itself spnngs m part from a desIre to
permit plaIntiffs to assert theIr federal nghts In a federal court, 237
the authonzatIon In the Fees Act may be vIewed as reInforcIng that
altogether salutary policy While it IS true that state and federal
courts have concurrent JunsdictIon over federal claIms, the Su
preme Court has quoted with approval the observatIon of two dis
tIngUIshed commentators that the federal courts are "the pnmary
and powerful reliances for vIndicatIng every nght gIven by the
ConstitutIon, the laws, and treatIes of the United States."238 At a
mIlllmum, the plamtiff should have a genUIne chOIce whether to
Ble her complamt m state or federal court, unrestraIned by consId
eratIons, such as attorney fee awards, that have nothIng to do with
the merits of the litIgatIon.
Finally the 1976 Fees Act authonzes an award of counsel fees
to plamtiffs who prevail" through out-of-court settlements even
though there has not been a full eVIdentIary heanng on the merits.
"If the litIgatIon tenlllnates by consent decree, for example, it
would be proper to award counsel fees. "239 The lower federal
courts have regularly awarded fees m such clrcumstances. 240 If
plaIntiffs may recover theIr fees from the courts when no decIsIOn
IS made on any of theIr claIms because the case IS settled, then it IS
appropnate to allow fees when Judgment IS entered on one of those
claIms even if it IS not covered by the Act. The argument In sup
port of fees m these two types of cases would appear equally
strong, and that was the congressIonal Judgment. To rule otherwIse
would encourage defendants to litIgate cases to death, knOWIng
that, even if they lose, they will not have to pay the plamtiff's at
torney fees if the ultImate Judgment rests on the non-fee claIm. It
does little for crowded dockets, m both state and federal courts, to
encourage unnecessarily extended and protracted litIgatIon.
237. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 922-23.
238. F FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
65 (1928) (quoted In Steffel
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974)) (emphaSIS added
by Supreme Court).
239. H.R. REP supra note 5, at 7 See also S. REP supra note 105, at 5, re
printed tn [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-13.
240. E.g., Gagne
Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 44 (1979); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
dented, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The courts, both state and federal, have generally followed the
congresslOnal directive, even when they were not fully aware of it.
There are mstances, however, when the rule has been mIsapplied,
leading to an erroneous analysIs or result or both. Part of the prob
lem may be that counsel and courts are not fully aware of the legIs
lative hIstory and the early JudicIal precedents applymg it. Fur
thermore, the adoption by Congress of the standards used to
determme pendent JunsdictIon may have mIsled state and federal
Judges to apply it to mappropnate cases. Despite these devIations,
the courts have generally applied it m the expanSIve manner m
tended by Congress.
The broad scope of the congresslOnally determmed rule of de
cislOn IS such that the Fees Act may m fact be available 10 a much
wIder range of cases than the precedents smce the Act mdicate.
ThIS IS so for several reasons: (1) The scope of section 1983 whlCh
extends to federal constitutional and statutory clatms; (2) the avail
ability of state as well as federal courts for mstitutmg multI-clrum
litigation mvolvmg federal and state questions; (3) the expansIve
nature of the pendent JunsdictlOn doctnne; and (4) the liberal Jom
der rules extant m most Amencan JunsdictIons. These factors, sm
gularly or m combmatIon, will provIde the baSIS for applymg the
1976 Fees Awards Act m an ever-widenmg CIrcle of litigation, es
pecIally m those lawsuits where the defendants are persons actmg
under color of state law It IS not Improbable to suggest that with
a little bit of creative thmkmg, many (and maybe most) suits
mvolvmg state action will be covered by the Fees Act. In thIS
sense, as one knowledgeable observer noted, the statute can have
as dramatic an Impact upon the establishment and enforcement of
basIc CIvil and constitutional nghts m thIS country as any CIvil
nghts legIslation smce Reconstruction. "241 It IS not necessary to
stretch the Act and its legIslative hIstory beyond theIr natural
Import to conclude that such an expanSIve use IS well withm the
parameters set by the Congress.
241.

Derfner, supra note 4, at 441.

